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The Defense of Traditional Marriage

George W Dent, Jr.*
The institution of marriage, which has been battered by decades of
social and legal change, is now being buffeted by demands that
marriage between persons of the same sex be legally recognized. For
many, this is the paramount goal for gays: it would signify social
acceptance of
sexuality.1

the moral equality of homosexuality and hetero

The Vermont Supreme

Court

recently boosted

this

campaign by requiring that the benefits of marriage be made available
to same-sex couples.2

The court left it to the legislature whether to

*
Schott-van den Eynden Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
The author is grateful for helpful suggestions from Teresa Collett, David Coolidge, Rick
Duncan and Lynn Wardle and from participants in a symposium on same-sex marriage
conducted by the University of Chicago Law School Roundtable. The author also thanks David
Dieteman and Ross Miller for their able research assistance.
l See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REAsON 311 (1992) (noting that "permitting
homosexual marriage would be widely interpreted as placing a stamp of approval on
homosexuality"); David L. Chambers, What If?: The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal
Needs o f Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447, 450 (1996) (legal recognition
"would signify the acceptance of lesbians and gay men as equal citizens more profoundly than
any other nondiscrimination laws that might be adopted. Most proponents of same-sex
marriage . .. want marriage first and foremost for this recognition.") (footnote omitted);
Thomas Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry, OUT/LOOK 6, FALL, 1989, at 1213 (arguing that gay marriage is "the political issue that most fully tests the dedication of
people who are not gay to full equality of gay people"); Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Tlmshold:
Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men and the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U.REv L.
& Soc. CHANGE 567, 607 (1994) (the significance of marriage lies in its "emotional, declarative,
and often religious power"). Accord Craig W.Christensen, IfNot Maniage? On Secwing Gay and
Lesbian Family Values by a "Simulacrum of Mmriage," 66 FORDHAM L. REv 1699, 1733, 1783-84
(1998) ("[I]t is likely that the most far-reaching consequence of legalized same sex-marriage
would be symbolic.... In one step, society would confer, perforce, the symbolic legitimation
of intimacy that is always implicit in the celebration of marriage."). See also Sheila Rose Foster,
.

.

The Symbolism of Rights and the Costs of Symbolism: Some Thoughts on the Campaign fD1· Same-Sex

7 TEMP. POL. & CIV.RTS. L. REV. 319, 321-23 (1998) (acknowledging the primacy of
symbolism in the campaign for gay marriage).

Marriage,

2 Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). The decision was based on an unusual provision
of the state constitution that reads, in pertinent part:
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fulfill this command by recognizing scu-ne-sex marriages,3 or domestic
partnerships, or otherwise. The demand for gay marriage deserves a
rebuttal. Moreover, the arguments on both sides of this debate apply
to many other relationships and activities (including polygamy, endog
amy, cloning and bestiality) that have been denied recognition as mar
riage and often condemned as crimes. Hence, the clamor for same-sex
marriage also challenges these exclusions and prohibitions.
This article reviews the possible justifications for legal recognition
of marriage and finds some, such as encouraging stable, loving
relationships, unpersuasive. However, other rationales-including
protecting children, socializing adults, and promoting individual
happiness-are valid, and these rationales apply only to traditional
marriages. Accordingly, society has strong reasons to favor traditional
marriage and to deny such treatment to tl1e unmarried and to
homosexual, endogamous and bestial relationships.
Part I of this article briefly reviews tl1e relevant law. Part II discusses
That governn1eut is, or ought to be} instituted for ilie common benefit! p rotection, and
security of the people, n ation, or community, and not for the particular emolumen t or advan
tage of any single person, family, or set of persons, who are a part only of that community.
Vt. Const., ch. I, art. 7.
A couple of earlier rulings favoring same-sex marriage were later legislatively overruled.
See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 75, 82 ( Haw. 1 993) (holding state must show compelling a
reason to deny recognition of same-sex marriages); on remand, Baehr v. Mii ke, Civ. No. 9 1 -1 394,
1 996 WL 694235 ( Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1 996) (finding no compelling reason ) . 1n 1 998 Hawaii
voters passed a Marriage Amendment to the state constitution provi ding: "The legislature shall
have the power to reserve marriage to opposi te-sex couples." Haw. Const., art. I, § 23
( http://www.state.hi.us/lrb/con/condoc.html (visited june 1 3, 2000 ) ) . The Hawaii Supreme
Court then held that the "amendment validated [the existing marriage statute] by taking
statute out of tl1e ambi t of the [state] equal p rotection clause." Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 911 394-05, 1 999 Haw. LEXIS 391, at * 3 (Haw. Dec. 9, 1 999) .
A similar ruling in Alaska Bmuse v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1 998 Wl�
88 743 (Alaska Super. Feb, 27, 1 9 98)-was also overruled by an amendment to the state
constitution. Alaska Canst., art. I, § 25 ( 1 998).
-

3 Some commentators dislike the term "same-sex marriage" because it suggests a "farcical
construct of . . . a marriage touted to be not just for gays, but for any two persons of the same
sex who wish to marry." Anthony C. Infanti, Baehr v. Lewin: A Step in the Right Direction for Goy
Rights ?, 4 LAw & SEXUALilY 1, 3 ( 1 994). This article will use the terms same-sex, gay and homo
sexual marriage interchangeably.
The word "homosexual" is also problematic: "t11ere is still no universally accepted
definition of homosexuality among clinicians and behavioral scientists." William Byrne &
Bruce Parsons, Human Sexual Orientation: The Biolngic Themies ReajJjnaised, 50 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 228 ( 1 993). Difficulty arises in part because sexual orientation is not bipolar but
forms a continuum from strictly heterosexual through bisexual to strictly homosexual. See infm
note 1 55. This article will not posit a precise definition altlwugh this may resul t in occasional
vagueness.

The Defense of Traditional Marriage

1999]

the legitimate grounds for law-making in the liberal state.
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Part III

analyzes some invalid justifications for legal recognition of marriage.
Part IV sets forth valid arguments for legal recognition. Part V rebuts
the arguments for same-sex marriage and other unconventional forms
of marriage.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW

Traditionally, American law did not recognize same-sex marriage
and courts routinely upheld this exclusion,4 but a few recent decisions
have required their recognition.5 These decisions raised the question
of whether other states would have to recognize gay marriages under
the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution.6
Several states adopted laws to deny recognition of same-sex marriages
even if validated in other states.7 Congress also adopted the Defense of
Marriage Act providing that states need not recognize a same-sex
marriage even if it is valid in another state and that in federal law mar
riage is heterosexual and monogamous.8
All legal systems recognize marriage.

The criteria for a valid

4 See Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A2d 307, 310-31 (D.C. App. 1995); In re Ladrach,
513 N.E.2d 828 (Oh. Ct. C.P. 1987); DeSanto v. Bamsley, 476 A.2d 952, 955-56 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1984); McConnell v. Nooner, 547 F.2d 54, 56 (8th Cir. 1976); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187,
1189 (Wash . Ct. App. 1974); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589-90 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973);
Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186-87 (Minn. 1971), app. dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 ( 1 972). For
other cases upholding the traditional male-female definition of marriage, see Storrs v.
Holcomb, 645 N.Y.S.2d 286, 288 (Sup. Ct. 1996); In re Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d 684, 685 (Sur. Ct.
1990), aff'd, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App. Div. 1993); Succession of Bacot, 502 So.2d 1118, 1 1 30 (La.
Ct. App_. 1987); Slayton v. Texas, 633 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex. App. 1982); Adams v. Howerton,
486 F. Supp. 1119, 1 122-23 (C.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd, 673 F.2d 1 036 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458
U.S. 1 111 (1982); Frances B. v. Mark B., 355 N.Y.S.2d 712, 716 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Anonymous v.
Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 501 (Sup. Ct. 1971);.

5 These cases are cited supra note 2.
6 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. See Richard D. Mohr, The Case for Gay Marriage, 9 NOTRE DAMEJ.L
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 215, 236 (1995) . The Constitution may not require recognition. For
example, recognition of polygamous or incestuous marriages is not required of states that have
a strong policy against validating such marriages. See Deborah M. Henson, Will Same-Sex Mar
riages Be Recognized in Sister States?: Full Faith and Credit and Due Pmcess Limitations on Stales'
Choice of Law Regarding the Status and Incidents of Homosexual Marriages Following Hawaii's Baehr
v. Lewin, 32 U. LOUISVILLE]. FAM. L. 551, 561-64 (1994). See generally F.H. Buckley & Larry E.
Ribstein, A ChoiciHlfLaw Solution to the Maniage Debates (forthcoming) .

7

See

Lynn D . Wardle, Williams v . North Carolina, Divorce Recognition, and Same-Sex Maniage
32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 187, 239 ( 1998) (listing statutes as of late 1998) .

Recognition,

8 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996) .
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Thus, some cultures permit polygamy or endogamy,

and others do not, but none has ever recognized gay marriages.9
Some Scandinavian nations register and grant some benefits to "do
mestic partnerships" of gay couples, but these arr;;mgements are still
distinguished from marriage.10 The universal restriction of marriage
to heterosexual relationships does not mean that the practice is
instinctive,
contingent.

but it does show that the practice is

not culturally

If a custom is important to group survival, it "will be

routinely rediscovered by every culture, without need of either genetic
descent or cultural transmission of the particulars."11
The issue here is not the permissibility but the legal recognition of
same-sex marriages. Unlike polygamy and endogamy, gay marriage is
not a crime, but neither is it legally valid. Two or rn,ore12 people of the
same sex may wed, treat themselves as married, and be treated as such
by all who wish to do so. These ceremonies have great emotional sig
nificance for some people.13

Some corporations and local govern

ments now give same-sex domestic partnerships certain employment

9 "Cultures and religions throughout history have recognized various forms of marriage.
Same-sex marriage has not been one of them." STEVEN F. NOLL, TWO SEXES, ONE FLESH: WHY
THE CHURCH CANNOT BLESS SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 41 (1997) . Historical recognition of gay
marriage is at most a rare exception that proves the rule. John Boswell claimed the medieval
Church treated some same-sex relationships as marriages. JOHN BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN
PRE-MODERN EUROPE 191 (1994). Most scholars see these relationships as fraternal, not sexual.
See Brent D. Shaw, Book Review, NEW REPUBLIC, July 18, 1994, at 33 (review of Boswell ) ; Robin
Darling Young, Gay Marriage: Reimagining Church Histo1y, FIRST THINGS, Nov., 1994, at 43-48;
Constance Woods, Same-Sex Unions or Semantic Illusions?, COMMUNIO, Summer, 1995, at 316-317.
William Eskridge catalogs many same-sex "marriages." WILLIAM N.ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CAsE
However, most of these involve pederasty or
FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 15-50 (1996).
transvestism, features that contemporary proponents of same-sex marriage disavow. In
general, his examples would strike most people as repugnant, not as admirable relationships
that society should endorse. See Richard F. Duncan, From Loving to Romer: Maniage and Moml
Discemment, 12 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 239, 249-50 (1998) (criticizing Eskridge's examples on moral
grounds) .
10 For example, these laws exclude most child-rearing rights.

See Lynn D. Wardle, The
1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 8�3, 892. See gen.emlly
and Divorce Regulation and Recognition: A Sumey, 29 FAM.

Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children,

Lynn D. Wardle, Intemational Marriage
L.Q. 497, 500 (1995).

11 DANIEL C. DENNETT, DARWIN'S DANGEROUS IDEA: EVOLUTION AND THE MEANINGS OF LIFE
487 (1995).

12 No state treats same-sex marriages as valid, so it seems that laws against polygamy do not
apply to same-sex marriages.
13 See Barbara]. Cox,

Same-Sex Mmriage and Choice ofLaw: If We Many in Hawaii, Are We Still

Married When We Return Home?,

"commitment ceremony" ) .

1994 WIS . L. REV. 1033, 1037 n. 12 (describing the author's

1999]

The Defense of Traditional Marriage

585

and other benefits granted to married couples.14
The nonrecognition of gay marriages has been challenged as an
unconstitutional denial of equal protection.

One question in the

constitutional debate is the level of scrutiny that this practice deserves.

Baehr

held that the stringent "compelling justification" test applies

under the Hawaii constitution.15

The United States Supreme Court

has applied the more lenient "rational basis" test in rejecting an equal
protection claim against a criminal sodomy law; the Court refused to
add homosexuality to the short list of categories that merit compelling
justification review.16 Scholars have debated this issue at lengthP To
rehash this argument is unnecessary since

the justifications for

traditional marriage easily survive even the stricter standard of review.
II. LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE LIBERAL STATE
+

Marriage and sex raise questions about the legitimate scope of the
law in liberal polities. The meaning of "liberal" is vague, but the core
idea is that people have certain rights-a measure of freedom from
government restraint of thought and action.

People disagree about

the scope of these rights. In this article, I posit a degree of individual
autonomy broad enough to satisfy almost everyone. First, it is agreed
that individuals have a "right to moral independence."18 Government
may forbid only acts that cause fairly direct, concrete harm to others.19
This pJiinciple is invoked to challenge, for example, laws against
14 See Wardle, supra note 10, 29 FAM. L. Q. at 509-11.
15 See Baehr, supra note 2.
16 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) .

1 7 For arguments i n favor a heightened level ofjudicial review, see Elvia R Arriola, Sexual
14 WOMEN'S
RIGHTS L. REP. 263, 272-78 (1992); William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Histmy of Same-Sex Maniage, 79
VA. L. REV. 1419, 1425 n.13 (1993). For contrary arguments, see Richard F. Duncan, Who
Wants To Stop The Chunh: Homosexual Rights Legislation, Public Policy, And Religious Freedom, 69
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 393, 407-11 (1994); Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional
Claims for Same-Sex Mmriage, 1996 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 88-95 (1996).
18 RONALD DWORKJN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 353 (1985) .
Identity and the Constitution: Homose:xual Persons as a Discrete and Insular Minority,

19 The classic source of the "harm" principle is Mill. See JOHN S. MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF
WOMEN (1869) ;JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTI (1859). However, the principle is questioned even
by many liberals who endorse the norm of moral independence. See Cass R. Sunstein, Social
Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 947-48 (1996) ("[o]bstacles to autonomy and to
good lives can . . . come from bad roles, norms, and meanings" which "sometimes private
groups are unable to . . . change on their own," so that government must shape norms so as to
nurture autonomy) .
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sodomy and abortion. The Supreme Court has sustained some of these
challenges,20 but even a challenge that fails in court may succeed in the
legislative arena. Thus, although the Supreme Court has upheld the
constitutionality of criminal sodomy Iaws,21 most states have repealed
these laws in the belief that homosexual acts in private between
consenting adults do not harm others and should not be forbidden
simply because a majority of citizens may consider the conduct
unnatural, disgusting, immoral or sinful.22
The legitimate scope of law-making is broader in what Cass Sunstein
calls the "expressive" function of the law, that is, "in expressing social
values and in encouraging social norms to move in particular
directions."23 Despite some reckless claims that the liberal state must
be value-neutral,24 thoughtful commentators recognize that govern
ment may promote certain values and discourage others.25 Indeed, it
could hardly do otherwise. Virtually all law-making reflects value judg
ments, many of which are controversial;26 to concede a sphere of

20 Roe v.Wade, 410 U.S. 113
21 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478

(1973).
U.S.

186, 196 (1986) (upholding Georgia criminal sodomy

statute).

22 See ES!ill!DGE, supm

note

prohibiting consensual sodomy."

" nly twenty states have fully enforceable laws
9, at 135: O
Further,

"sodomy laws are almost never enforced against

lesbians, bisexuals, or gay men within private spaces."

23

Jd. at 184.

supra note 18, at 953. See also Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning,
62 U. CH I.L.REv. 943 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of the Law, 144 U. PA.
L REv. 2021 (1996). This function is important to family law. See Carol Weisbrod, On the
Expressive Functions ofFamily Law, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 991 (1989).
Sunstein,

24 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL jUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 11

(1980) ( No reason [for
"

exercising power] is a good reason if it requires the power holder to assert ... that his concep
tion of the good is better than that asserted by any of his fellow citizens.");

supra note 17,

at

191 ("[P]olitical decisions must be, so as far

sec also DWORJUN,

as is possible, independent of any

particular conception of the good life, or of what gives value to life.").More considered state
ments by Professor Dworkin contradict these passages.

See infin note 28.

25 In A Theo1y ofjustice, perhaps the most influential liberal statement on legitimacy, john
Rawls accepts the need for "some notion of goodness, for we need assumptions about the par

jOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF jUSTICE 396 (1971 ). See also
The Momlity of Homosexual Conduct: A Response tofolm Finn is, 9 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB.POL'Y 41, 43 (1995): "[E]ven if the state cannot legitimately criminalize
ties' motives in the original position."
Michael J. Perry,

some particular conduct, it may nonetheless be the case that the state can legitimately judge
the conduct to be immoral and, on the basis of that judgment, try to discourage tl1e conduct or
to protect others from it."

26

"[G]overnments must inevitably act on the basis of some controversial conception of the

. ... " ROBERT
MORALilY (1993) at 162.

human good

P. GEORGE,

MA!UNG MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC
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individuai autonomy is itself a value judgment.27
The expressive
function is especially important in family law, which serves "both as a
mechanism for meeting the needs of family members and as a vehicle

for expressing our values and aspirations about family life to ourselves
and our children."28 Thus the state may favor certain conduct, for
instance by subsidizing education in some areas but not in others, even
though some people dislike the state's choices. The state may also dis
courage activities (such as smoking, drinking and gambling) both by
taxation and exhortation, even if the state could not forbid these
activities.

As these examples suggest, govemment may promote (or

discourage) conduct because it believes that the conduct benefits (or
harms) the individual, even if the individual does not agree.29 The ex
pressive function of law is important because the social norms it fosters
encourage good behavior; without this effect, coercion or economic
pressure might be needed to induce desirable behavior.30
Legal preferences concerning material interests, like health and
wealth, provoke little opposition. May government also promote (or
deter) activity that it believes is spiritually enriching (or da.TTiaging)?
For some libertarians, spiritual enlightenment, or happiness, is a
private matter in which the state should not interfere, especially when
people disagree about what increases true happiness. However, virtu
ally all societies, including ours, accept that government may promote
spiritual well-being. Thus the state promotes the arts through public
schooling, tax deductions for gifts to the arts, official acclaim (such as
naming a poet laureate), subsidies for artistic activity, and beautifi
cation of public works. These efforts are accepted even though they
do not improve public health or increase economic output. Moreover,
the scope of proper state action is broader for children than for adults
because children are less able to determine and protect their own
interests. Thus the state may mandate schooling and medical care for
children even when it could not do so for adults.
27 See id. at 158.
28 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Sex, Lies, and Dissipation: The Discourse ofFault in a No-Fault
Era, 82 GEO. LJ. 2525,2526 (1994).
29 Thus even Ronald Dworkin supports seat-belt laws on the ground that they give people
what they really want rather than overriding their true desires. Ronald Dworkin, Foundations of
a Liberal Equality, in 11 TANNER LECfURES ON HUMAN VALUES 77 (Grethe B. Peterson ed. 1990).
30 See WILlARD GAYLIN & BRUCE jENNINGS, THE PERVERSION OF AUTONOMY 185 (1996)
(appeals to social emotions are less oppressive than physical force); Sunstein, supra note 18, at
918 & n. 51, 955.
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There is some tension between the liberal principles of democracy
and individual autonomy. To thrive as a free person one needs certain
attributes, including the skills necessary to earn a decent income,
sufficient education to participate intelligently in public affairs, and a
moral character strong enough to exercise one's autonomy to fashion
a satisfYing life.

Democracy cannot prosper unless most citizens

possess these attributes.

The growing complexity of modern life

demands more of these attributes for both individuals and society as a
whole to flourish. People do not automatically acquire these qualities,
though.

The problems underdeveloped countries face in building

democracy and economic prosperity show both the impossibility of
achieving these goals without a populace that is adequately prepared
and the difficulty of developing such a populace. Thus; ironically, an
active government is necessary to nurture the kind of citizenry that can
flourish under limited

(or liberal)

government and

make that

government work.
Even in its expressive functions, though, the state should not
embrace values arbitrarily. As Dworkin puts it: "People have the right
not to suffer disadvantage in the distribution of social goods and
opportunities . . . just on the ground that their officials or fellow
citizens think that their opinions about the right way for them to lead
their own lives are ignoble or wrong."31 Similarly, Cass Sunstein says:
"without very good reasons, social and legal structures ought not to
tum differences that are irrelevant from the moral point of view into

social disadvantages."32 As Sunstein implies, moral considerations are

appropriate in law-making, but the majority is not right simply because
it is the majority.
The most influential statement of the liberal theory of justice comes
from John Rawls. Rawls says justice demands rules that are fair in that
they would be acceptable to persons in the "original position"-that is,
without such particular features as wealth, race, sex, sexual orientation,
and family status, that can lead to support for rules that favor one's
own interests over others' interests.33 Although Rawls has many
critics,34 this article accepts his principle. We may even extend Sun-

31 DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 353.
32 Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. LJ. 1, 13 (1994).
33 RAWLS, supra note 24, at 11-17, 136-42.
34 E.g., R.M. Hare, Rawls' Themy ofJustice: Part II, 23 PHIL. Q. (SCOT.) 241 (1973); Russell

Hittinger, John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 47 REV. METAPHYSICS 585 (1994); Douglas B.
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stein's proposition and insist that, even where there are morally rele
vant differences, the legal consequences of those differences should be
reasonable, not excessive.

Thus, even if there is a valid basis for the

law to favor traditional over same-sex marriage, defenders of the law
should still explain why this disparate legal treatment is not dispro
porti�mate.
This does not mean that defenders of a promotional (as opposed to
a prohibitory)

law bear a heavy burden of proving the practical

benefits of a .law or of alternatives to it, especially if the law touches
matters of great social concern and the alternatives are untested. The
20th century is littered with the ruins of grandiose social schemes that
were

earnestly promoted

by

intelligent

people

promising great

benefits but that ultimately inflicted terrible damage.

Experience

proves the iron law of unintended consequences-new laws may or
may not achieve their intended results, but they always produce

unexpected results.35

Human society is too complex and too poorly

understood to permit confident predictions of the effects of significant
legal change. A democracy may choose to experiment on itself, but it
need not do so.

Defenders of traditional laws may justly demand

caution and convincing evidence that change will at least not make
matters worse.36 Tradition should not be followed blindly, but it
deserves respect and may be properly maintained in case of doubt,

especially concerning acts traditionally considered repugnant.37

Because marriage and the family are entwined with religion in
Western (and most other) civilizations, the role of religion in law
making must be addressed. America, like many liberal states, forbids

establishment of religion,38 but all law rests on norms that are not

Rasmussen, A Critique ofRawls' Theory ofjustice, 55 PERSONALIST 303 (1974).
35 Even a liberal like Isaiah Berlin championed our "common sense beliefs, which at least
have the merit of having been tested by long experience, " over theories lacking empirical
support. ISAIAH BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE FOX 32 (1953).
36 See David D. Haddock & Daniel D. Polsby, Family as a Rational Classification, 74 WASH.
U.L.Q. 15, 45-46 (1996) (noting many unanswered questions about homosexual marriage and
arguing for "the legal system treading very carefully until some of the answers to those
questions emerge from the research currently under way").
37 Physician and philosopher Leon Kass argues that our feelings of repugnance should be
given weight in public policy: "in this age . . . repugnance may be the only voice that speaks up
to defend the central core of our humanity. " Leon R. Kass, The WISdom of Repugnance, NEW
REPUBLIC, june 2, 1997, at 20.
38 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. " U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
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empi1ically verifiable.39 A law is not invalid simply because the values it
expresses stem from religion if those values are accessible to con
ventional secular thought.'10 Indeed, the liberal notion of human
rights originated from religion, as evidenced by the statement in the
Declaration of Independence: "We hold these Truths to be self
evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights."41 The abolition of slavery,
for example, is not illegitimate just because it sprang from a belief that
slavery is offensive to God. The same is true of arguments for gay
rights, which are often based on religion.42
Western marriage laws grew out of and still largely reflect Christian
beliefs,'13 but these laws do not establish religion-they neither
command nor promote Christian faith or practices. Moreover, as this
article shows, traditional maniage laws can be justified on exclusively
secular grounds.
III. F.A.LSE JUST!FICATIONS OF MY..JUUAGE
Many justifications have been offered for legal recognition of
marriage, but not all of them are persuasive.

A. To Encourage Stable, Loving Relationships
Some argue that love is the only valid requisite for maniage:H This
claim is both too broad and too narrow. It is too broad because many
loving relationships are considered improper for marriage. Love takes
39 Both
A.

reli

gi ous and

secular moralists

ultimately founct their views on faith. See RlCHARD

POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORALANDLEGAL THEORY (1999).

40 Laws that do not compel or even e ncourage adherence to some religion can still be
hard to justify on secular grounds. Thus forbidding consumption of meat on Fridays (as the
Catholic Church once did) or consumption of pork (as Islam and judaism do) would be hard
to vindicate in secular terms even though those rules do not compel or encourage adherence
to any religion .
.Jl

T I l E DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
-

42

See Samuel A. Marcosson, The "Special Rights" CanaTd in lhe Debale Over Lesbian and Gay
Civil Righls, 9 NOTRE DAMEJ.L . ETHIGS & PUB. POL'Y 1 37, 166 (1995) ("basic religious tenets . . .
mj;port th e cause of barring discrimination on Lhe basis of sexual orientation") (emphasis in
original ) .

43 The qualification "largely" i s needed because Christian beliefs vary among
denominations and change within denominations over time. For example, our l aws permit
divorce, which most Protestant sects allow but which the Roman Catholic Church opposes.
44 See Andrew H. Friedman, Same-Sex Mania.ge and lhe Right to Privacy: Abandoning Scriptural,
Canonical, and Naluml Law Based Definitions of Maniage, 35 HOWARD LJ. 1 73, 222-23 (1991).
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C.S. Lewis distinguished family love, affection, erotic

desire, friendship, and compassion.45 All can be good, but compassion
is not deemed a basis for marriage.

Close relatives often love each

other but cannot marry.46 One who is married may love a third party
more than one's spouse, but one cannot marry the third party.47
Children can love but cannot marry. Many people love pets, but they
cannot marry them.

Hence, homosexual love is not the only love

ineligible for marriage.

Indeed, many forms of sexual love, such as

pederasty, adultery, bestiality and incest, are criminal even in states
that permit homosexual acts.48
This justification is also too narrow because love is not necessary for
marriage. Love was long considered unimportant to marriage in the

West, and still is in many non-Western societies.49 Marriage exists in
part-especially in some traditions-to provide for rearing children
and for certain kinds of care and support between wife and husband.5°
Even in liberal states Jove is never a precondition to marriage, nor

does its absence invalidate a marriage.51 Most marriages were once ar
ranged by parents; Lhe couple might never see each other before the
wedding.52 Even in liberal societies many would consider a marriage
successful despite the absence of romantic love if the couple treat each
other with care, kindness and respect.

In sum, love is neither a

necessary nor a sufficient condition for a socially or legally acceptable
marriage.

45 C.S. LEWIS, THE FOUR LOVES (1960).
46 See infra. notes 253-64 and accompanying text.

47 See infra notes 239-52 and accompanying text.

48 See HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 150 (3d ed. 1995) (in half the states
adultery is still a crime).
49 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 471-74 (1995). See also Margaret F. Brinig
& Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism, 23]. LEGAL STUD. 869, 875 (1994) ("Although
affection might grow out of long and close association between the spouses, it was by no means
necessary for the practical purposes of marriage."). But see 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MARRIAGE AND
THE FAMILY 431 (1995) (stating that North Americans view love as the basis for marriage and as
important to its continuation).

50 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MARRIAG E AND THE FAMILY 472 (1995)
51 Jd..
52 See id. at 473 ( "Arranged marriages are the norm in many parts of the world. " ).
.
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B. Legal Benefits ofMarriage
Some say it is unfair to deny gays the legal benefits of marriage. 53 If
so, however, it is also wrong to withhold these benefits from unmarried
people, and we should not validate gay marriages but eliminate the
legal benefits of marriage, as some propose.54 Some private and public
employers now grant domestic partners (usually including but not
limited to gay partners) of employees benefits which were traditionally
limited to spouses.55

Such changes do not necessitate changing the

legal definition of marriage.
The tangible benefits of marriage do not interest most advocates of
gay maniage.56 This is not surprising. The law confers some 1uaterial
benefits on marriage, such as special tax treatment and coverage for
spouses under some social welfare programs (like Social Security).
These benefits are minor, though; most couples hardly consider Lhem
in deciding whether to marry.

Marriage also incurs legal detriments,

such as higher tax rates on two-earner couples, that often outweigh the
benefits.57 The law also sets legal rights of married people regarding
child custody, division of assets, and right to support. These rights can
be imporL:"1nt after marriage, but they rarely provide an incentive to
wed, primarily because they are a zero-sum game-the right of one
spouse is the disability of the other.
gays
53

54

bother

to

utilize

See ESKRIDGE, supm note

laws

It is no surp1ise, Lhen, that few

recognizing

domestic

partners.58

9, at 66-74.

MARTHA FINE!v!AN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 228-30 (1995); Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get "What We Ash For:
See

vt?,y Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Jvlaniage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Eve�y

1179 VA. L. REv. 1535, 1549 (1993) ("AdvocaLing lesbian and gay marriage 1viH detract
from, even contradict, efforts to unhook economic benefits from marriage and make basic
health care and other necessities available to all.").
hJaniage,

55 See supm note 14.

56 See Chambers, supm note 1, at 450 ("[F]ew advocates [of gay marriage] address at any
length the legal consequences of marriage").
57 See james Aim & Leslie A Whittington, For Love or Morny? The Impact of Taxes on Maniage,
66 ECONOMICA 297 (1999) (marriage penalty tax reduces the marriage rate); Richard L.
Elbert, Love, God, and Country: Religious Freedom and the Mmriage Penalty Tax, 5 SETON HALL
CONST. LJ. 1171, 1174-85 (1995) (describing history and status of the penalty); Richard B.
Malamud, Allocation of the joint &tum lvlarriage Penalty and Bonus, 15 VA. TAX REV. 489 (1996);
C. Eugene Steuerle, \faluing Marital Commitment: The Radical RestmctU7ing of our Tax and
Transfer Systems, 9 RESPONSIVE COMMUN. 35 (1999) (finding an "extraordinary array of marriage
..

[tax] penalties").

58 By the end of 1997 fewer than 300 couples had registered, and about 25% of these were
siblings or elderly parents and adult children. See Susan Essoyan, Hawaii Finds Slow Response to
Domestic Pmtners Law, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 28, 1997, at AS, available in 1997 WL
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Proponents of gay maniage care not about the material benefits it
would bring but about its social acceptance as equal to traditional mar
riage.59
C.

Religious Rationales
Marriage has religious significance in Western and most other

cultures. Basing the legal definition of maniage on religion would not
breach the Constitution's Establishment Clause because it does not
endorse or compel obeaience to any faith, but religion alone cannot
justify law in a liberal state. 60

IV. VALID ARGUMENTS FOR TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE
All societies celebrate maniage.
Weddings typically feature
elaborate rituals (usually religious) and festivities. 61 Marriage also has
major legal consequences in all cultures.62 Most religions venerate
maniage, but even atheists must be struck by the prestige universally
conferred upon maniage.

The only event generally deemed more

important is the installation of a new ruler. There must be powerful
global reasons for this special treatment.

A. Child Rearing
1. The Importance ofMarriage to Child-Rearing
The

primary social function of

maniage is rearing

children.

Christianity has long recognized this.

The medieval jurist Gratian
considered offspring the purpose of marriage.63 The first English
16187525.
59 See supra note l.
60 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The Right to Death, NEWYORJ{ REV. BOOKS, Jan. 31, 1991, at 14,
17 ( [T] he Constitution does not allow states to justify policy on grounds of religious doc
trine") . See a./so supra text accompanying notes 38-41 (values underlying law should be
accessible to secular thought).
61 See Chambers, supra note 1, at 450 ("In our country, as in most societies throughout the
"

world, marriage is the single most significant communal ceremony of belonging. It marks not
just a joining of two people, but ajoining of families and an occasion for tifbal celebration and
solidarity.")
62 See I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MARRIAG E AND THE FAMILY 182-87 (1995) (concerning divorce); II
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MARRIA GE AND THE FAMILY 442-47, 562-65 (1995) (concerning consequences
of marriage for property ownership and related issues) .
63 See John T. Noonan, Jr., Contraception: A History of its Treatment by the Catholic
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Book of Common Prayer listed Lhe rearing of children as the first
reason for marriage.64

A..fter the decision in

Baehr

favoring gay

marriage, the Hawaii legislature resolved that marriage is "intended to
foster and protect the propagation of the human race."65 Government
efforts to provide comprehensive child care have never succeeded;66 in
every society today child-rearing is performed primarily by parents.
Government programs can help children but can never substitute for
good parents. 57
In the middle of this century America gradually forgot the impor
tance of traditional marriage to children.

Illegitimacy and divorce

("broken families") had been rare, so their effects on children were
often considered minor and ascribed to causes (like poverty) other
than family structure.

The explosion of bastardy_ and divorce in the

last thirty years prompted closer inquiry, which revived appreciation of
the importance of marriage to children.

Under every standard

educational achievement, drug use, criminal activity, physical and
emotional health, social adjustment and adult earnings-children of
intact marriages have fewer problems than children of broken fa_mi
lies.68

Other causes, like poverty, add to childhood problems, but

"[c]hildren in one-parent families are much worse off than those in
two-parent families even when both families have t11e same earnings."69
Moreover, other causes (like poverty) are not wholly separate but stem
partly from marital failure.70

Theologians and Canonists 174, 289 (1966);

Genital Good,

8 COMMUNIO 198, 214 (1981)

64 The other two reasons were to avoid the sin of fornication and to encourage couples to

provide "mutual society, help and comfort." Noll,

su.pra note 9,

at 41-42.

65 Ac t ofJune 22, 1994, No. 217, § I, 1994 Haw. Sess. Laws 217, -reprinted in 20 FAJ<l. L. REP.
2013, 2015 (1994).

6

6 Even the most promising attempt-the communal raising of children in Israeli
kibbutzim-has been largely abandoned. See Karl Zinmeister, Actually, Villages A-re Lonsy at
Raising Pm-Sclwol Children, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE, May/June 1996, at 52, 54 (in nearly all
kibbutzim "[i] nfant care has shifted back to parents").
67 See Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Right, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Ap ri l 1993, at
47, 48 ("If we fail to come to terms with the relationship between family structure and
declining child well-being, then it will be increasingly difficult to improve children's life
prospects, no matter how many new programs the federal government funds.").

68

See

generally

William Galston,

A Liberal-Democratic

Case

for

the

Two-Parent Family,

RESPONSrvE COMMUNITY, Winter 1990-91, 14-26.

69 James Q. Wilson, Hu.ma.n. Remedies for Social Disorders, PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1998, at 25,
27-28. See also SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT:
WHAT HURTS, WHAT HELPS (1994).
70 Sa infra note 117 and accompanying text.
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When one parent is absent, it is usually the father.

The father's

absence from the home is damaging to children.71 Unwed fathers can

be diligent but in practice rarely are: "All available evidence suggests
that

the most effective pathway to involved, committed, and
responsible fatherhood is marriage."72 Not only do children need two

parents; it also seems that ideally a child should have both a mother
and a father.73

Some claim that same-sex couples can serve equally

well as parents. Studies of children raised by gay parents are inconclu
sive, partly because samples have been so smal1.74 Absent firmer
empirical evidence, it is reasonable to assume that children with both a
mother and a father will learn better how to live in a world composed
of males and females.75

Although marriage involves an agreement between two people, it is

not governed by general contract law.

"[M]any of the terms of the

marriage are prescribed by the state, not to be varied by the parties'
private agreements."76 The special treatment of marriage is justified by
the presence of children: young children and children yet unborn
cannot negotiate for themselves,

so the

imposing contract terms on the parents.77

ally

the wife)

state

protects

them

by

Further, one spouse (usu

often makes "significant and specific investments:

contributions of time and energy and money, to each other and to
their children, that may not see fruition for many years and tl1at may
71 Wade F. Hom & Andrew Bush, Fathers and Welfare Reform, PUB. INTEREST, Fall 1997, at
38, 39.
72 Id, at 41.

73 See ELISABETH BADINTER, XY: ON MAsCULINE IDENTI1Y 43-66 (Lydia Davis, trans.,
Columbia University Press lst ed. 1995) (1992); DAVID POPENOE, LiFE WITHOUT FATHER 139190 (1996); MARY STEWART VAN LEEUWEN, GENDER AND GRACE (1990); Mary Stewart Van
Leeuwen, Opposite Sexes Or Neighbming Sexes ? The Importance of Gender in the Welfa·re Responsibility
Debate, in WELFARE IN AMERICA 243, 243-74 (Stanley W. Carlson-Thies & James W. Skillen eds.,
1996); Mary Stewart Van Leeuwen, To Ask a Better Question: The Heterosexuality-Homosexuality
Debate Revisited, in INTERPRETATION (forthcoming); Wardle, Potential Impact, supra note 10, at
857-64 (discussing the importance to children of having both a mother and a father).
74 See infra note 104.

75 See ELIZABETH MOBERLY, PSYCHOGENESIS: THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF GENDER IDENTI1Y
79 (1983) (ascribing homosexuality primarily to a child's inability to identify with the parental
figure of the same sex). Presumably, this is more likely to happen if a child has no parent of
the same sex. This proposition does not require any assumption of significant innate behavior
al differences between women and men. Even if the differences are socially determined,
children must learn to live with them.
76 Brinig & Crafton, supm note 48, at 870.
77 See Gary Becker & Kevin Murphy, The Family and the State, 31J.L. & ECON.

I,

3-5 (1988).
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b e worthless if the relationship does not endure. "78 But Lhe marriage
relationship is "so complex that any attempt to specify in detail all of i ts
terms would be futile as well as perhaps destructive. "7 9
Since gay couples cannot reproduce, these considerations would
not apply to gay marriages.

Recognition of gay marriages would

to relax the mandatory contract terms
To treat gay
designed for traditional marriages with children. 80

inevitably lead

to efforts

m arriages differently would violate the notion that gay marriages are

fundamentally the same as traditional marriages. 8 1 Some compromise

would be likely, but any compromise would impair the suitability of
mmital law for traditional couples.
Although some dismiss the traditional family as an anachronism, a
vestige, a historical relic, the opposite is tme-the traditional f<U-nily is
m ore essen tial now Lhan ever. In order to thrive the modern, liberal,
capitalist democracy needs citizens with higher j ob skills, education,
and moral character than pre-modem or undemocratic societies.
These qualities are best cultivated in the traditional family; indeed, no

socieLy has developed such a citizenry except through the tradi tional
family.

A cohesive community can compensate in part for paren t's

shortcomings, but in the mobile, atomized modern world tight-knit
communities are rare. Thus " the family, and specifically the bourgeois
family, is the necessary social context for the emergence of the auton
omous individuals who are the empirical foundation of poli tical
democracy. "8 2
When people were few, procreation was encouraged to h elp each
7 8 Brinig

& Crafton,

supt-a note 48, at 871 .

79 !d. at 870-71 .
8 0 Many proponents
ways.

of gay m arriage already advocate changing marriage laws in many

See infra n o tes 174-80

and accompanying text. Many also support more relaxed ani tudes

toward adultery and divorce.

81

See infra notes 224-36 and accompanying

text.

l t would be unwise t o distinguish marriages b y t h e "neutral" criterion o f wheth e r a

couple has children.

One spouse often makes an investm e n t in the marriage prior to and in

anticipation of having children.

For example, if a couple plans to have children and to have

the wife care for them in infancy, she may work rather than expand h e r education, then bank
her earnings and saved tuition.

If this couple divorces, even before having children, the set

tle m e n t should take this con tribution into account. For a gay couple, though, this reasoning
would not apply.

82

BIUGIITE & PETER BERGER, THE WAR OVER THE FAMILY: CAPTURING THE MIDDLE GROUND

172 (1984) (emphasis omi tted ) . See also GAYUN & JENNINGS, supra note 29, at 103 ( [M] arriage
"

. . . serve [s] to bind sexual desire to reproduction and child care. By destroying the conditions
that support paren ting . . . we would destroy t h e child-and not only the child, but the socie ty

that will later be shaped by those parentless children, will suffer." ) .
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tribe and humanity in general to survive. Underpopulation is rarely a
problem today.83 However, with fertility below replacement level in
most developed countries, marriage with children may cease to be the
norm. The concern for others that matures through bearing and rais
ing children could then give way to hedonism and narcissism.84
Society may properly avoid this by favoring traditional marriage.
Traditional marriage is not incompatible with contraception, as
claimed by some natural law scholars. 85 Contracepted sex can tighten
a marriage while delaying conception until the couple is ready to care
properly for children. 86 It can also prevent the conception of more
children than the couple can adequately care for. Thus contraception
can assist good parenting�
2. Marital Cohesion Affects All of Society
Hillary Clinton reminded America of the forgotten truth that it
takes a village to raise a child. 87 " [S] ociety requires a critical mass of
married, two-parent families, both to raise their own children well and
to serve as models for those who are being reared outside of the
'conventional' family."88 If broken families are few, their children still
have many models of intact families (among relatives and neighbors,
for example) to show them that this is the norm, what is expected of
them, and to teach them what it means to be part of an intact family.
It is hard for a child to learn how to be a good spouse and parent when
he sees few examples around him.
Similarly, when the children of broken families are few, the
misconduct to which they are prone is the exception. The majority in
intact families set a standard that children from broken families tend
83 Low population is a problem for some groups, though. For example, the low birth rate
of American Jews combined with their ' high rate of intermarriage with non:Jews in a growing
population makes some worry that there could eventually be too few Americans with a Jewish
identity to constitute a viable community. See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE VANISHING AMERICAN
JEW 1-2, 24-32 (1997) (giving statistics on the declining number of American Jews).
84 See infra text accompanying notes 113-15.
85 SeeJohn M. Finnis, Law, Marality, and "Sexual Orientation, " 9 NOTRE DAME J.L ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 11, 30-31 (1995).
.

86 See Perry, supra note 24, at 50.
87 HIUARY RODHAM CLINTON, IT TAKES A VILLAGE (1996).
88 Hom & Bush, supra note 70, at 42. See also WIWAM A GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES 285

(1991) (arguing family structure is not solely a private matter because it affects the stability of
families generally). See also AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY 248 (1993) ("To shore
up the moral foundations of our society, we start with the family").

598

[Vo1 .XV:581

Journal of Law & Politics

to follow because children are even more loathe Lhan adults to be
different. If children from broken families predominate, though, they
set a s tandard which other children tend to follow.

In sum, if most

children come from intact families, they pull up the behavior of other
children; when m os t children come from broken families, they pull
down the behavior of others.
More broadly,

traditional marriage is inextricably

tied

to our

concern for future generations and for the welfare of o thers. Concern
for o thers is n o t innate-an infant cares only about i tself, n o t others.
Al tmisrn is n o t learned primarily in formal schooling but by experi
ence acquired in part in our own families-first as children of our
paren ts, then as spouses and as parents of our children.89

We also

learn from our social milieu; we l earn benevolence in a community
where m arrying and raising children is norm al . To care for our ovvn
children-their

schools,

their

safe ty,

their socializatio n

community-we must to some extent care for others.

into

the

Moreover, al

though we are mortal, unaffected by events after we die, to care for our
children we must care about the future world in which they will live
after we die.
Altruism is often fragmentary; we may prefer ourselves to our
children,
strangers.

our children

to

our neighbors,

and

our neighbors

to

But even partial altruism is an importan t social adhesive,

and it can be augmented by more abstract concepts of benevolence,
such as the Christian command to love not only those closest to us but
all humanity, even our enemies.

Thus the family provides both the

li teral nursery for our children and the metaphoric nursery of the
family of m an .
If the traditional family ceases to b e the norm , al LTUism will erode.90
In every society some people do n o t or cannot marry and bear and
raise children. If they are viewed as unfortunate exceptions, the n o rm

is n o t impaired.

Recognition of gay marriages would m u tilate the

norm by granting, for the first time in history, equal honor to
partnerships that inherently exclude tl1e creation of life.

The impact

would be greater if, as seems likely, few gays elected to m arry, stay

89 See infra notes 1 13-19 and accompanying te xt (traditional marriage socializes adults,
especially men, but same-sex marriage would not do so).
90 See Gaylin & Jennings, supm note 29, at 114-19 (describing the profound influence of
parents on the moral development of children). See also iufra note 114 (marriage teaches "the
acceptance of responsibilities we have not willed or chosen").

1 999]

599

The Defense of Traditional Marriage

married, and adopted children.91

Like legalizing bestiality, cloning,

and baby-selling,92 validation of gay marriage would not cause direct,
proximate harm, but it would damage society by degrading the way we
see and relate to others. Traditional marriage is a public good. That
is, it benefits not only married couples and their children but also
generates positive externalities, or benefits to others. Men and women
who marry and stay married encourage others to do likewise, to the
profit of society.
Judaism and Christianity are unusual in their reverence for the
family and condemnation of polygamy and homosexuality.93
ascendancy of Western civilization in the last
part from this attitude.
bourgeois

500 years

The

may stem in

By nurturing the institution that best instills

values, Judaism

and

Christianity

made

economic and technological progress of the West.

possible

the

Some of the

harsher aspects of this attitude, such as criminalization of sodomy, may
be unnecessary, but retaining reverence for the family may be essential
to preserving and extending this progress.

3. Marriage Needs Society 's Support
Unfortunately, marriages do not always occur and endure without
encouragement from society.
difficult

and

Raising children is one of the m ost

demanding jobs

human

beings

undertake.

The

temptation to shirk this task is especially strong in the modern world.
In the past the monetary cost of raising children was low, limited
primarily to simple food and clothing. Most people were farmers for
whom children earned their keep from an early age by helping with
farm work.

Adult children supported parents grown too old for

laborious farm work.

Modern societies need parents to give children

much more, including expensive, long-term schooling and health
care.

Today, few children can help with their parents' jobs.

The

opportunity costs of children are also higher for modem bourgeois
couples who, unlike poor farmers, can devote available tim e to earning
money at high rates or to innumerable leisure activities.
children reduces time available for these pursuits.

Caring for

Finally, child

91 See supra note 57 (few gays have used domestic partnership Jaws); infra notes 230 & 306
(instability of most gay male relationships).
92 See infra notes 265-84 and accompanying text.
93 See Sheryl E. Michaelson, Note, Religion and Morality Legislation: A Reexamination of
Establishment Clause Analysis, 59 N.Y .U. L. Rev. 301, 308 & n.32 (1984).
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rearing is often unpleasant and emotionally draining.

Not surpris

ingly, then, parents are sometimes tempted to neglect their children 's
needs.
Despite the burdens of child-rearing,

many people

traordinary efforts to have and care for children.
endure

great

expense,

physical

pain,

humiliation in trying to conceive a baby.

emotional

m ake

ex

Many couples
trauma,

and

Others battle repeated

obstacles to adopt a child. The high cost of giving children good care
is paid not only by people who can easily afford it but also by many
who are less wealthy and for whom tl1e cost requires great sacrifice.
Many parents absorb the unusual costs of children with disabilities,
medical problems, or other special needs.
Regrettably, modem l ife often hinders good parenting.

Market

economies encourage m aterial consumption by ubiqui tous advertising
and exhortati ons to self-gratification. The support for parenting l ong
provided by religion is corroded by widespread secularism . M arriage
and the family are denigrated by elites,94 educators9 5 and gay activists.96
The state helps parents by providing services (like public schools) a n d
subsidies (like tax credits a n d deductions) for chil dren, and surely
more could be done, but tl1e state can never fully compensate the
work good parents do. However, the state can encourage and support
parents by recognizing and honoring m aniage as the insti tution that
best facilitates good parenting.97
It is not enough for society to applaud marriage wi thout reference
to the purpose of raising children .

Indiscriminate applause could

suggest that m arriage exists to m aximize self-gratification and should,
tl1erefore , be dissolved when

it :no lon ger seems to serve that pt!11)0Se,

94 First Lady Hillary Clinton once compared marriage to slavery. Hil lary Rodham, Chi!dTcn
Uuder the Law, 43 HAIN. EDUC. REV. 487, 493 (1973).

95 See Tamar Lewin, St-udy Criticizes Textbool!s on Marriage os Pessimistic, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17,
1997, at A5, describing a study that concludes: "College student.s are being taught a pessimistic

and sometimes inaccurate view of marriage, with great empha>is on issues like divorce and
domestic violence, and little attention to the benefit.s of marriage, particularly for child-rearing

96 See infra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
97 See FRANCIS FUKUYA!v!A,
(1995):

TRUST:

THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND TI-lE CREATION OF PROSPERITY 5

A strong and stable family s tructure and durable social insti tutions cannot be legislated
into existence . . . A thriving civil society depends on a people's habits, customs, and ethics
attributes that can be shaped only indirectly through conscious political action and must
otherwise be nourished through an increased awareness and respect for culture.
.
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especially when the going gets rough. Child-rearing always has rough
periods; that's precisely when society's help is most needed to keep par
ents together. What is wanted, then, is a buttress applied at this point
of greatest stress; that is, an attitude that bolsters marriage as an institu
tion for raising children. As social esteem for marriage and parenting
declines,

so

does

citizens'

willingness

to

assume

these

Validation of same-sex marriages would accelerate this decline.

roles . 9 8

Gay couples do not conceive, so of course advocates of gay marriage
tend to ignore the connection of marriage with child rearing. More
telling, when they do note the connection, its significance escapes
them.

For example, Andrew Koppelman notes "the resentment that

those with familial responsibilities that weigh heavily upon them feel
toward those who seem free of such responsibilities."99

Yet he then

drops the point without considering that it might explain the need for
society to celebrate traditional marriage.1 00

4. The Significance of Childless Heterosexual Couples
An objection to this justification of marriage is that heterosexual
couples may marry even if they cannot or choose not to have chil
dren.1 01 The argument is unpersuasive. First, society does not know
which couples these are when they marry and could not even try to
find

out without incurring substantial government expense and
unusual and offensive intrusion on their priva cy.1 02 Second, condi98 Between 1957 and 1976 the "proportion of working men who found marriage and
children burdensome and restrictive more than doubled." Whitehead, supra note 66, at 58.
99 ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUAL11 Y 173 (1996).
1 00 Andrew Sullivan acknowledges
a difference that [he thinks] is inherent between homosexual and
heterosexual adults [is that] . . . [t]he latter group is committed to the
procreation of a new generation. The former simply isn't. . . . The
timeless, necessary, procreative unity of a man and a woman is inherently
denied to homosexuals; and the way in which . . . parenthood transforms
their relationship, is far less common among homosexuals than among
heterosexuals.
ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY 196 (1995).
Paula Ettelbrick concedes that the "origins of marriage are deeply imbedded in procreation
and the two-parent family" and homosexual "family structures will never fit the heterosexual
model. " Paula L. Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert: A Comment on Lesbian and Gay Family Recognition, 5
J.L & POL Y 107, 160 (1996).
1 01 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 96; Mohr, supm note 6, at 223; SULLIVAN, supm note 100,
at 179 (1995); Sunstein, supra note 31, at 6.
1 02 See Richard F. Duncan, Homosexual Manio.ge and the Myth of Tolerance: Is Cm·dinal
'
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tions existing at the time of marriage may later change.
do not want to bear children may change their minds.

Couples who

Couples who

think they cannot bear children may prove wrong or, by medical help,

become able to bear children. By contrast, we know without intrusion
that same-sex couples are sterile and will remain so.

Third, sterile

couples can adopt. Same-sex couples can also adopt if the law permits,
but there is considerable controversy about the effect on children
being raised by a homosexual couple. 1 03 Finally, even heterosexual
couples that do not bear children reinforce the model of traditional
marriage. 1 04
Exceptions do not invalidate a norm or the necessity of norms.

How some individuals make use of marriage, either volitionally or as
the result of some incapacity, does not determine the purpose of that
institution. In that context, heterosexual sterility does not contradict
the meaning of marriage in the way same-sex unions would. 1 05
Childless marriages are imperfect models, but no marriage is a

Platonic ideal.

By upholding marriage as a social norm, childless

couples encourage others to foBow that norm, including couples who
might otherwise have illegitimate children.
Similarly, childless marriages may discourage divorce among cou

ples with children.

Childless

couples have

been

respected

for

centuries. Many medieval theologians were hostile to sex and barely
tolerated marriage as an inferior but, because of human frailty, neces
sary alternative to chastity.

In St. Paul's words, "It is better to marry

than to burn with passion." 1 06 Still, they uniformly acknowledged the
validity of childless marriages and of sex within those marriages. 1 0 7

O'ConnoT a "Homophobe'?, 10 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 587, 597 { 1 996) ("the state
could not exclude infertile heterosexual couples from marriage without imposing onerous
invasions of privacy") .
1 03 Studies on gay parenting lack statistical validity. See Philip A. Belc� tro et aL, A Review of
Data Based Studies Addressing the Effects of Homosexual Pm·en.ting on Children's Sexual and Social
Functioning, 20 ]. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 1 05 (1993) ; Wardle, Potential Impact, supra note 10, at
844-52. See also Wardle, id. at 852-57, describing some possible dangers of gay parenting.
1 04 "Even marriages that do not give rise to children exist in accord with, rather than in
opposition to, [the] heterosexual norm." The Homosexual Movement: A Response by the Rn.msey
Colloquium, FIRST THINGS, March 1994, at 15, 18. The Ramsey Colloquium "is a group ofjewish
and Christian theologians, ethicists, philosophers, and scholars that meets periodically to
consider questions of morality, religion, and public life." ld. at 15.
lOS Editmial, C OMM ONWEAL, May 1 7, 1 996, at 6.

106 I Corinthians 7:9.
1 07 See VERN L. BULLOUGH & jAMES A. BRUNDAGE, SEXUAL PRACTICES AND THE MEDIEVAL
CHURCH 65-66 ( 1 982) (stating that Thomas Aquinas deemed intercourse natural and permissi-
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This a ttitude persists today in the restrictions on divorce of childless
couples. 10 8 Iflove and protection of children were the only reasons for
social concern about marriage, the law would require only mutual
consent for the divorce of childless couples.

Society has an interest,

though, in preserving these marriages as images (albeit imperfect) of a
social ideal and in discouraging the attitude that marriages may be
quickly and casually dissolved. 1 09
Homosexual couples do not reinforce the model of traditional mar

riage. They send conflicting signals to children who must decide how
to live their lives in a confusing world Y 0 This does not mean that
legitimizing gay marriages would lure o therwise heterosexual children
into homosexuality, although that might happen occasionally. Rather,
validation

of

same-sex

marnages

would

eviscerate

society's

endorsement of traditional marriage l l l and thereby suggest indiffer
ence to illegitimacy, divorce, and child neglect.

B. Socializing Adults
Marriage channels potentially destructive energy into beneficial
activity. As the Ramsey Colloquium says: "Marriage is a place where, in

a singular manner, our waywardness begins to be healed and our fear

of commitment overcome, where we may learn to place another per
son's needs rather than our own desires at the center of life." 1 1 2 As an
editorial in the journal

Commonweal stated:

Is there really any doubt that in tying sexual attraction

to love and love to children and the creation of fami
lies,

marriage

fundamentally

shapes

our

human dignity and the nature of society?

ideas

of

Same-sex

marriage, whatever its virtues, would narrow that frame

ble for barren couples).
108 Although most states no longer require fault for divorce, they still require a delay
before divorce can be granted. See Annat., 62 AL.R.2d 1 262-65 ( 1 994) (describing state
statutes requiring delay before divorce) .
1 09 See Whitehead, supra. note 66, at 49 (asserting that liberal divorce laws undermine
marriage generally by making divorce more socially acceptable ) .
1 1 0 See Elizabeth Kristol, The Ma.nying Kind, FIRST THINGS, jan., 1 996, at 45, 46 (reviewin g
ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY ( 1995) ) .

1 1 1 See infra. notes 200-10 and accompanying text (recognition of same-sex marriage would
diminish esteem for marriage ) .
112 The Homosexual Movement A Response by the Ramsey Colloquium, supra. note 105, at 1 7.
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and foreshorten our perspective. Marriage, at its best,
tutors us as no other experience can in the given
nature of human life and the acceptance of
responsibilities we have not willed or chosen. 1 1 3
In the mid-twentieth century Americans lost this truth. With peace
and prosperity, most Americans thrived, and the interests of individual
and society usually coincided. That is, most people prospered through
education, work, marriage, sobriety, thrift, and obedience to law-ali
values that benefit society generally. Those who divorced or never
manied tended to suffer for it; they had greater problems with drug
use, criminal activity, physical and emotional health, social adjustment
and earning a living. 1 1 4 In short, it was in the interests of individuals to
marry and to stay married, and most did. Those who did not were
generally regarded as either victims of unfortunate circumstances or as
losers.
The breakdown of the family in Lhe last 25 years reminded us of the
importance of marriage in socializin!l adults. As the number of
unmarried adults increased, so did the wayward conduct to which they
are prone. The problem is greatest in inner cities ravaged by crime
aJ1d dn1g abuse, mostly committed by unmarried men. Just as the
breakdo-wn of the family has a cumulative effect on children that
exceeds its arithmetic growth, 1 1 5 so it also has a cumulative effect on
adults. When bachelorhood was rare, adults were pressed to marry lest
they be pitied or despised. That pressure has dissipated, and in some
communities maniage is now so rare as to seem odd or even bizarre.
As tJ1e resulting anti-social conduct proliferates, those w h o won1rl
fonnerly have avoided such conduct because it was considered deviant
or disgraceful are no longer deterred.
There is also a negative synergy between tJ1e effects on children and
on adults of the breakdown of u'le faxuily. Children of broken fatuilies
•

u

�

1 1 3 Edit01ial, supm n o te 1 06, at 6.
1 1 4 The pathology of bachelorhood

is particularly striking fo r men. See GEORGE AKERLOF,
MEN WITHOUT CHILDREN ( 1997 ) . The study notes, for example, that the i n carceration for
young married men is 2.6 per thousand, compared with 1 7.6 per thousand young single m e n .
S o m e believe t h a t men a r e genetically harder t o socialize than wom e n . See Natalie Angier,
Parental Origin oJChmmosome May Detennine Social Gmces, Scientists Say, N.Y. TIMES, june 1 2, 1 997,

at A2 (reporting a s tudy finding that girls lackin g an X chromosome from their fathers were
more anti-social; this suggests that the higher frequency of anti-social behavior i n males, who
get

a

Y rath er than

a n X chromosome from their fathers, has a gen e ti c basis) .

1 1 5 See supra text following note 66.
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are less likely to marry, and unmarried adults are less likely to be good

citizens if they come from broken families. 1 1 6 With the breakdown of
the traditional family there is a proliferation of people who grow up in
broken families and never marry as adults; these people are especially
likely to misbehave.
Some believe that recognizing same-sex marriage would help to
socialize homosexuals.1 1 7 This seems unlikely because men are domes
ticated not by a wedding but by women and childrenY 8 By law and by
social and religious tradition fathers are supposed to provide for and
instruct their children.

Despite the declining importance of gender

differences, an expectation (sometimes reflected in the application if
not the letter of the law) 1 19 lingers that husbands should be the prima

ry breadwinners in the family. These laws, traditions and expectations,
which urge men to be socially responsible, would not extend to same
sex marriages.
C.

Promoting Individual Happiness
Traditional marriage enriches the individuals who enter into i t as

well as their children and society generally. This effect satisfies even a
strict test of liberal legitimacy because many benefits of marriage are
not metaphysical but empirically verifiable. Married people live longer
and

enjoy better physical and

psychological

health

and

greater

wealth. 1 20
Traditional marriage

also yields spiritual

benefits.

As Roger

Scruton says: "In the heterosexual act, it might be said, I m ove out from
1 1 6 See Wardle, Potential Impact, supra note 1 0, at 856.

1 1 7 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 84 (same-sex marriage "civilizes gay men by making them
more like lesbians").

l l B See GEORGE GILDER, MEN AND MARRIAGE 76 ( 1993); Hadley Arkes, The Closet Stmight,
NAT'L REV.,July 5, 1993, at 43. This also follows from evidence that men are harder to socialize
than women, see supra note 1 15, and that l esbians are less promiscuous and more likely to
achieve long-term relationships than gay men, see infra note 3 1 1 and accompanying text.
l l 9 Thus, despite the demise of laws distinguishing between husbands and wives with

respect to child custody and alimony in divorce, it remains much more common for wives to
get custody and for husbands to be required to pay alimony. See infra note 1 45.
1 2 0 See Linda ]. Waite, Does Marriage Maller?, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 483 (1 995 ) ; Hara Estroff
Marano, Debunking the Marriage Myth: It Works for Women, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1 998, at F1
(citing findings that for both men and women marriage "lengthens life, substantially boosts
physical and emotional health and raises income over that of single or divorced people or
those who live together"). This phenomenon is observed in other countries as well. See Steven
Stack & ]. Ross Eshleman, Marital Status and Happiness: A 1 7-Nation Study, 60 ]. MARR. & FAM.
527 ( 1 998).
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my body towards tl1e o tl1er, whose flesh is unknown t o m e ; while i n the
homosexual act I remain locked wifuin my own body, narcissistically
contemplating in fue oilier an excitement fuat is a mirror of my
own . " 1 2 1 Alfuough fuis view echoes Judeo-Christian tenets, i t i s not a
The unique value of
mere expression of religious opinion.
heterosexual m arried love has been acknowledged in so m any cultures
fuat it may be talcen as a general human good, like art and music, even
if that value cannot be proved empirically.
Bearing and raising children in a traditional marriage is also an
The joy and fulfillment of parenthood
intrinsic human good.
acknowledged in all societies testifY strongly to their universali ty.
These attitudes may well have a scien tific basis: According to one
evolutionary hypofuesis, love emerged along wi fu the evolution of
helpless offspring needing care from both parents, wifu consequent
commitment and pairing. People ch erish a spouse because iliat
spouse is fue one person on a planet of billions who has as much of an
interest in the fate of their children as t11ey do.1 22
The persistence of homosexuality, divorce and marital s tt-ife shows
fuat tl1is evolved trait is not dominant in many people. A person can
feel romantic, erotic love for anofuer person of the same sex, just as
one can feel such love for a pet, even though reproduction is
impossible in bofu cases. Government should not punish people
simply because a genetic trai t is weak or lacking in them . If tl1e
scientific basis of enduring love is exclusively heterosexual, fuough,
government can promote human happiness by favoring traditional
marriage as ilie most conducive setting for love. Validating gay
marriage would confuse and compromise this effect.
Adoption and illegitimate children can bring happin ess, too, but
are everywhere considered less desirable for botl1 parents and
children. Thus, government m ay validly favor traditional marriage as a
human good. This does not mean the state should encourage a high

1 21

ROGER SCRUTON, SEXUAL DESIRE: A MORAL PHILOSOPI-N OF THE EROTIC 3 1 0 ( 1 986)

Similar reasoning opposes endogamy. See infra notes 254-56 and
see also Patrick Lee & Robert P. George, \•Wwt Sex Can Be: SelfAlierwlion,
Illusion, Or One-Flesh Union, 1997 AM . J . JUIUS. 1 35 (arguing that h e terosexual mari tal sex is an
(emphasis in origin al ) .

accompanying text;

Belief that traditional marriage is in trinsically good is not limited to

intrinsic human good ) .
Judaism and Christi anity.

See DAVID M. BUSS, EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 1 2 1 ( 1 999)

(finding

that of 18 characteristics checked i n i n ternational study on choosing a mate, "mutual attracti on
or love proved to b e the most highly valued in a potential mate by both sexes " ) .

122 Buss, supra note

1 22.
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birth rate or penalize couples who cannot or choose not to bear child

ren. 1 23 However, government may grant traditional marriage benefits,

including honor, in order to promote the intrinsic good of bearing
and

ra1smg

children.

Although

homosexual

acts

are

sterile,

homosexuals can play a meaningful role in their families and have
often done so.

They can have important bonds with their parents,

siblings, nieces and nephews. Indeed, without children of their own,
they can devote greater attention to these relationships than can adults
with children.
V. REFUTING THE ARGUMENTS FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

A. Rights to Autonomy in Intimate Relationships
Some view legal recognition of same-sex marriages as part of a
broad right to autonomy in intimate relationships, a corollary of the
right of heterosexual couples to marry, to reproduce, to use con
traceptives, and to obtain abortions. But there is no such right, even
among consenting heterosexual adults. Thus the Supreme Court has
upheld laws against polygamy1 24 and has never questioned laws against
incest, adultery, bestiality and necrophilia.

Unlike these other activi

ties, same-sex marriage is not a crime; it is simply denied the legal
recognition afforded to traditional marriages. Government has wider
latitude in promoting than in punishing behavior. 1 2 5 Sexual autonomy
is often claimed to be an element of privacy. 1 2 6

claim

Whatever force this

has against criminal sodomy statutes does not extend to

recognition of same-sex marriage, which entails abandonment of
privacy and a demand for public validation.

Indeed, if sexual

autonomy is a right, the state should have "no authority to sanction, to
reward, or even to approve one set of family relations over another," as

some gay activists argue. 1 27

1 23 See supra notes 102-10 and accompanying text.
1 24 Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 20 ( 1 946) ; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
1 45 ( 1 878). See Earl M. Maltz, Constitutional Protection for the Right to Many: A Dissenting View, 60
GEO. WASI-l. L. REv. 949 ( 1 992) (denying a general constitutional right to marry) .
1 2S See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.

1 26 See Friedman, supra. note 43 (making a privacy claim for same-sex marriage) .
1 27 FRANK BROWNING, THE CULTURE OF DESIRE: PARADOX AND PERVERSilY I N GAY LIVES
TODAY 1 54 ( 1993) (describing the position taken by Paula Ettelbrick during presentation
opposing gay marriage, Chicago, Illinois, October 1989) . See also Fenton Johnson, Wedded to an
Illusion, HARPER'S MAG., November 1996, at 43, 49 (benefits should be granted to " couples who
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The Supreme Court has forbidden states t o deny recogmtwn to
some marriages, but i t has never questioned the favored status of
traditional marriage and has upheld n o t only laws against polygamy

but also some restrictions on marriage of prison inmates 1 28 even
though these strictures are much less widely established than the

nonrecognition of same-sex m arriages . Where the Court has sustained
a constitutional right to marry, i t has referred to m arriage as "the
relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society" and to
protecting the "decision to m arry and raise [a] child in a traditional

family setting. " 1 29

So stated, this righ t obviously does not encompass

gay marnage.

As already shown, society has good reason to favor tradi tional

marriage. 1 30 Accordingly, there is good reason n o t to embrace a righ t
of sexual autonomy so broad as to deny that preference.

B. Equality: Sex Discrimination and the Analogy to Race Discrimination
1. Sex Discrimination
Some argue that traditional marriage is sex discriminati o n . 1 3 1

In

one sense this claim is false: traditional l aw treats the sexes equally in
that everyone m ay marry a person of the other sex but not a person of
the same sex.

This rationale elicits two objections.

The first is m ore

fonnal : If a man may marry a woman, it is sex discrimination to forbid
a woman to m arry a woman. This argum ent serves p1imarily to remind

us how elusive or empty is the idea of equality. 1 32

The principle of

equality insists that likes be treated alike; but since i t does not tell us
demonstrate stability," whether or not they are marri e d ) .

1 28

See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 ( 1 987) (striking down some restrictions on the right of
prison i n mates to m arry but upheld others ) . Compare Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 ( 1 9 77) (up
holding provisions of the Social Security Act that terminated benefits to dependent children
upon marriage to a person not entitled to benefits under the Act even though the prospect of
losing benefits might deter some affected people from marrying) with Zablocki v. Red hail, 434
U.S. 374 (1 978) (striking down law forbidding indige n t, support-obligated fathers of children
receiving public assistance to marry) .

129 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 ( 1 978 ) .
1 3 0 See supra notes 62-130 and accompan}�ng te�a.
1 31

See Baehr v.

Le�n, 852 P.2d 44, nconsidemtion granted, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1 993)

(holding that law recognizing heterosexual but not homosexual marriages constitutes sex
discrimination in violation of the state constitution's Equal Protection Clause and Equal Righ ts
Amendment) ; KOPPELMAN, supra note 100, at 1 5 4 ; Andrew Koppelman, \VIIy Discrimination
Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Disairnination, 69 NYU. L REV. 1 97 ( 1 994) .

132 See Peter Westen,

The Empty idea ofEquality,

95 HARV. L REV. 537 ( 1 982 ) .
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which things are alike, the principle collapses into a tautology-things
that should be - treated

alike should be

distinctions based on sex are illegal.

treated

alike.

Not all

We h ave separate bathrooms,

sports teams and singing groups for men and women, so the sex
distinction in marriage law is not necessarily improper. 133

Discrimination against homosexual acts has been defended because
they involve

different conduct from heterosexual acts.

Andrew

Koppelman objects that some sexual acts can be performed by either
homosexual or heterosexual couples.1 34 Any force this obj ection has

for criminal sodomy laws does not extend to marriage. As Koppelman
concedes, only heterosexual couples can perform reproductive inter
course. 1 35 Since the main social function of marriage is child-rearing,
society is warranted

in

distinguishing between

heterosexual conduct for purposes of marriage.

homosexual

and

It is irrelevant that

heterosexual couples may engage in sexual acts other than vaginal
intercourse. A society may (and ours usually does) treat marital sex as
private.

Non-reproductive sex can also strengthen a marriage and

thereby make a couple better parents. 1 3 6
Koppelman

and others also argue

that discrimination

against

homosexuals oppresses women-heterosexism reinforces sexism. 1 37

He says sexism requires systematic sexual domination of women by
men. Homosexuality is suppressed because i t undermines this domina
tion. Male homosexuality is especially threatening because society
deems sexual penetration a humiliation to be borne only by women.
This theory has many problems, beginning with the assumption of
unrelieved male domination in our society.

Many factors cited to

prove the subordination of racial minorities-shorter life expectancy
and higher rates of illiteracy, school failure, drug abuse, mental illness
133 This is true though some women are bigger, stronger or have deeper voices than some
men. Thus these facts refute Andrew Koppelman's claims that sex-based classifications are per
missible only if they reflect generalizations that are "exceptionless," Andrew Koppelman, Sexual
Orientation Discrimination as Sex Discrimination: Answering the Objections 1 6 (unpublished manu
script Oct. 14, 1 999) ; and that " [a] party challenging a sex-based classification is not required
to show anything about the relation between the statute and the subordination of women." Id.
at 28.
134 KOPPELMAN, supra note 100, at 157.
1 35 ld.
136 See supra. note 86 and accompanying text. Nor is i t relevant that some heterosexual
couples conceive children by means other than vagin al intercourse or do not have children at
all. See supra. notes 102-1 1 0 and accompanying text.
137 KOPPELMAN, supra note 1 00, at 153-76.
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incarceration-would

suggest

Lhat

males,

not

fem ales,

are

disadvantaged in our society.
I t is dubious that such sexual inequality as does exist is sustained by
heterosexism.

As Koppelman concedes, cultures that approve h omo

sexual i ty also subordinate women; indeed, "it is possible for male
homosexuality (at least) to be associated with m ale privilege and the

repudiation of women ." 1 38

Hence Koppelman retreats to the claim

that " ' h omophobia directed by men against m en is misogynistic. "' 1 3 9

Even this narrower claim is shaky, though.

If h eterosexisrn supports

male dominance, one would expect women to view homosexuality
more favorably tl1an men do, but Koppelman recognizes that this is

generally not the case. 1 40

Even if discrimination against h omosexuality did

bolster male

dominance, it would be questionable whether traditional marriage
laws contribute to this effect.

One would have to argue that non

recognition of same-sex marriages makes traditi onal m arriage (m ore)
disadvantageous to women. This argument seems implausible; indeed,
many of Koppelman's own statements seem to refute i t. He recognizes
that women may support traditional families for fear of "'losing
traditional male support."' 1 4 1

He even concedes "it may be that tradi
tional sex roles are the best ones for women."1 4 2 We need not go that

far. We need only recognize that the financial, physical and emotional
burdens of child-rearing are better borne by tw-o paren ts than by one.
Thus m en and women who have or expect to h ave children benefi t
from laws and customs that protect the traditional family.

Indeed,

since in all societies a parent who leaves the family is m ore likely to be
the

father, women

have

a

more

obvious

in terest

than

m r> n

in

sheltering the tradi tional family.
More obvious, though maybe not m ore important. Al though tradi1 3 8 Id. al 1 7 l . See also infra text accompanying n ote 1 50 .
1 39 !d., quoting EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, BETWEEN MEN: ENGLISH LITERATURE AND MALE
HOMOSEXUAL DESIRE 20 ( 1 985) .
1 4° KOPPELMAN, supra note 1 00, a t 1 6 1 n.52, quoting Gregory M . Herek, On Heterosexual
Masculinity: Some Psychical Consequences of the Social Construction of Gender and Sexuality, 29 AM .
BEI-IAV. SCI. 563, 564-65 ( 1 986) : "National opinion polls typically fi n d no sign ifican t difference
betwe en males' and fem ales' responses to questions about h o m osexuality."

Since this fact

weakens his attempt to link he terosexism to sexism, Koppelman then quo tes Herek on some
" [s] maller-scale experi m e n tal and questionnaire studies,"
desperate and unsuccessful.

id., but this rescue effort seems

1 4 1 !d. a t 1 73, quotingJEFFREYWEEKS, SEXUALITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS 3 7 ( 1 985 ) .
1 4 2 !d. at l 74.
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tional marriage benefits both sexes, it seems to curb the inclinations of
men more than of women. 143
reluctance of men to marry.

This is evidenced by the greater
Moreover, in some ways traditional

marriage does not cement male dominance but alleviates a male
Children have closer biological ties to their mothers

disadvantage.

than� to their fathers.

Conception is the end of the father's biological

tie to the child but only the beginning of the mother's tie, which
extends through nine months of pregnancy and, typically, through
several months of nursing.
Without traditional marriage, the rights of the father, and even his
identity, would be tenuous. Many societies, including our own, grant
mothers greater rights.

For example, mothers get child custody in

most divorces and have exclusive discretion to abort. 1 44 To some extent
traditional marriage mitigates the inequality of paternal and maternal
rights, though.

Thus Koppelman's thesis, as applied to marriage,

seems not only unproved but backwards-traditional marriage restricts
the

conduct

of men

more than

of women

and

relieves

some

disadvantages of fathers. 1 45
Koppelman says homophobia is aimed particularly against men to

deter them from fleeing heterosexuality, 1 46 but people do not flee
from superiority.

Indeed, Koppelman himself recognizes a more

plausible analysis: "resentment that those with familial responsibilities
that weigh heavily upon them feel toward those who seem free from
such responsibilities."147 In this view the role of husband/father is n o t
a privilege of sexual domination but a responsibility s o onerous that
society must punish men who shirk it.
Some common sexual terms reveal scorn for women and male
1 43 Despite the tangible benefits of marriage to men, see AKERLOF, supra note 1 15, " [ m ] e n
may experience the sexual exclusivity expected within marriage as more o f a burden" than d o
women, Amy Wax, Bargaining i n the Shadow of the Markel: Is There a Future for Egalitarian
Maniage, 84 VA. L. REV. 509 ( 1 998) .
1 4 4 See ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKJN, DNIDING THE CHILD 9 8- 1 1 4 ( 1993)
(mothers get custody 70-80% of the time); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 893-95
( 1 992) (striking down law requiring consent of or even notice to father before abortion) .
1 45 Indeed, in light of arguments like Koppelman's, it is ironic that William Eskridge
supports gay marriage due in part to the tendency of (gay) males to "lose their balance and
succumb to private sirens if they are not socially and even legally constrained." ESKRIDGE, s·upra
note 9, at 83. Thus the argument for recognition of gay marriage is also based on gender
stereotypes.
14 6 See KOPPELMAN, supra note 100, at 1 64-65, 1 7 1 .
1 47 /d. a t 1 73.
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To be "screwed," for example, is to be mistreated.

The vernacular also illuminates gender relations in marriage.
usage treats marriage as degrading to women.

Some

More often, though,

marriage is depicted as depriving men of freedom (sexual and other
wise) and saddling them with financial and other burdens. When a
woman marries a man she puts a ring in his nose.

By contrast, the

bachelor is a playboy-footloose, carefree, sexually adventurous, with
plenty of money to spend on his own pleasures. That these images are
empirically false enhances rather than diminishes their psychological

significance-despite the facts, men view marriage as detrimental. Gay
marriage is often supported in order to promote public acceptance of
homosexual conduct, but such acceptance may be "inconsistent with a
proper recognition of the equality of women with. men in intrinsic

worth." 1 49

Some say discrimination against homosexual conduct is improper
(and unconstitutional) because sexual orientation is involuntary and

immutable and sexual pleasure is too central to human flourishing to

be restricted by law without a compelling reason, which is lacking
here.1 5 0 Even if sexual orientation is immutable, it does not follow that
law cannot base distinctions on it. Many laws tum on involuntary
characteristics, like age.1 5 1 They also differentiate by sex when there is
good reason to do so, as in providing separate bedrooms or bathrooms
for men and women to preserve sexual privacy. This separation is not

universal-many societies (at one time, all societies) deem such privacy
unnecessary, even absurd. Thus, the justification for such distinctions
need not be universal, but only reasonable by the standards of our own
society. 1 52
A few people are immutably homosexual in that they cannot enjoy

l4S See II ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HOMOSEXUALI1Y (Walter R. Dynes, ed., 1 990) 1 200 (terms for
homosexuals "tend to express in their meaning or derivation the hostility, the contempt, the
hatred, and the fear that straight people have felt toward gay sex and those who practice it") .
149 Finnis, supra note 85, at 24.
1 50 The Supreme Court has sometimes disfavored laws that discriminate on the basis of
"immutable" characteristics. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686-87 ( 1973).
1 5 1 Thus blindness is involuntary yet is a bar to a driver's license, and a genetic
predisposition to crim e would not excuse criminal activity. Sunstein, sujn-a note 3 1 , at 9.
1 52 See Dennis Prager, Homosexuality, the Bible and Us-a jewish Perspective, THE PUBLI C
Summer, 1 993, at 60, 73 (arguing that " [w]hether or not homosexuals choose
homosexuality is entirely unrelated to the question of whether society ought to regard it as an
equally valid way of life").
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heterosexual relations, 153 but many people can enj oy both.

6 13
Kinsey

found that sexual orientation is not strictly bipolar but forms a
continuum covering strong and weak preferences and neutrality

between gay and heterosexual acts. 154

In societies intolerant of

homosexuality more men with homosexual inclinations will enter
traditi onal marriages. 155

Moreover, even if sexual orientation is

immutable in some adults, it does not follow that it is fixed at birth.
Some scientists believe that sexual orientation may be influenced by
experience in early childhood. 15 6
Scholars disagree about the immutability of sexual orientation.157
Koppelman premises his whole argument on the immutability of
sexuality.

Again, he claims that male "homophobia" stems from the

"homophobe's" uncertainty and anxiety about his own sexuality, 15 8 but

uncertainty arises only if sexuality is fluid.

Law and social attitudes

influence the frequency of homosexual behavior, as evidenced by the
widely different rates of homosexual conduct between societies that
condone and societies that condemn it.159

And even those capable

only of homosexual relations are, if sane, able to abstain from sex with

153 The most extensive study to date found that in America 2.8% of adult males and 1 .4 %
o f adult females are predominantly homosexual. See ROBERT T . MICHAEL, E T AL., SEX I N
AMERICA: A DEFINITNE SURVEY 1 76 (1994) ; EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, ET AL., THE SOCIAL
ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALilY 297 ( 1 994). Very few people are totally incapable of enjoying
heterosexual relations. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 1 00-0 1 .
1 5 4 ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR I N THE HUMAN MALE 638-41 ( 1 948); see also

ALAN P. BELL & MARTIN S. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUAUTIES: A STUDY OF DNERSllY AMONG MEN

AND WOMEN 53-61 { 1 978) ; RICHARD C. FRIEDMAN, MALE HOMOSEXUALilY: A CONTEMPORARY
PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTNE 3 ( 1 988).

155 POSNER, supra note 1, at 1 1 7.
15 6 See J. Maddox, Is Homosexuality Hardwi1·ed?, NATURE, Sept. 5, 1 9 9 1 , at 1 3 (stating that
childhood experiences (including sexual arousal) may cause physical changes in the brain that
become permanent) .
157 Compare POSNER, supm note 1 , at 295 (concluding that the evidence indicates "strongly
though n o t conclusively" that sexual orientation is more "determined" than "chosen") with
Janet E. Halley, Sexual Otientation and the Politics of Biology: A Ctitique of the A1gument fi"om
Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REv. 503 ( 1994) (denying the claim of immutability) . A recent study
could not replicate the results of a study by a homosexual activist purporting to identi:f)' a "gay
gene." George Rice, et aL, Male Homosexuality: Absence of Linkage to Microsatellite MmkeTS at Xq28,
SCIENCE, April 23, 1999, at 665. Some studies report substantial success with h omosexuals who
expressed a desire to change their sexual orientation. See, e.g., THOMAS E. SCHMIDT, STRAIGHT
AND NARROW? COMPASSION AND CLARilY IN THE HOMOSEXUALilY DEBATE 1 53-58 { 1 995).
15 8 KOPPELMAN, supra note 100, at 164-65, 1 7 1 .

1 5 9 See I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HOMOSEXUALilY, supra note 1 49, 578-80 (describing the impact
ofsocial attitudes on homosexual conduct) .
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others. Validating same-sex marriages would sow confusion: "children
confronted with two equally legitimate images of adult sexual roles
would be rudderless for many years, and no one knows what personal
or social toll would result from this prolonged period of sexual con

fusion."1 60

Because heterosexual monogamy requires equal numbers of mar
riageable men and women, because there is already a relative scarcity
of marriageable males, and because homosexuality seems to be more
common among men than women, even a small increase in the
number

of active

homosexuals

could

exacerbate

the

imbalance

between marriageable men and women.1 61 Again, liberal societies can

(and often do) encourage behavior they consider socially beneficial
without having to conclude that some contrary behavior, which is not
so favored, is harmful. Traditional marriage is beneficial, so it is not
improper, as sex discrimination or otherwise, for society to recognize it
but not other kinds of marriage. Traditional marriage is encouraged
by treating it as unique, which it would not be if same-sex marriages
were treated equally.

Therefore, ihe main consequence of recogniz

ing same-sex marriage would not be a shift of some people to homo
sexual conduct, but the change in heterosexuals' no longer seeing
traditional marriage as something special.

2. The Analogy to Racial Discrimination
Advocates of same-sex marriage compare it to interracial
marriage. 1 62 Defenders of anti-miscegenation laws denied that they
were racially discriminatory because they treated all races alike by
limiting everyone to marrying a person of the same race. In

Virginia163

Loving v.

the Supreme Court looked beyond this formal equality and

found the laws discriminatory because they were "designed to maintain
White Supremacy."1 64 The laws were intended to preserve apartheid, a
160 Kristol, supra note 1 1 1, at 46.
1 61 See infra n otes 237-38 and accompanying text. Further, validation of same-sex marriage
would diminish esteem for marriage (see infra notes 202-10 and accompanying text) and
thereby weaken the incentives for heterosexual men to marry.
162 See Richard A. Epstein, Caste and the Civil Rights Laws: From jim Cmw to Same-Sex
Maniages, 9 2 MICH. L. REV. 2456, 2474-75 ( 1 994) ; Andrew Koppelman, The Miscegenation
Anawgy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE LJ 1 45 (1 988); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality
and tlu; Social Meaning of Gender, 1 988 WIS. L. REV. 1 87, 232-33.
163 388 U.S. I ( 1 967).
164 !d. at 1 1 .
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racial caste system, by enforcing "racial boundaries. " 1 65
Gay
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marriage

is

radically

different

from,

and

antipodal

to,

interracial marriage within the traditions of Western culture. 1 66 Chris

tianity expressly condemned racism as, for example, in the parable of

the Good Samaritan. 1 67 Anti-miscegenation laws were almost unheard
of outside the United States, and less than one-third of the states had
such laws when Loving was decided. 1 6 8 Thus in striking down these
laws

Loving

did not reject but embraced Western tradition.

By

contrast, neither the West nor any other culture has ever recognized
same-sex

marriage,

and

Christianity,

like

Judaism,

has

condemned homosexual acts. By embracing Western tradition

always

Loving

argues against recognition of same-sex marriage.
Anti-miscegenation laws prevented intimate contact between the
races. Traditional marriage laws do not keep the sexes apart but bring

them together. 1 69

Interracial marriages create mixed-race children;

same-sex marriages do not create mixed-gender children.

In the

analogy between race and gender, traditional marriage resembles
integration; gay marriage resembles segregation.

It is not surprising,

then, that most Afro-Americans reject the analogy between the civil
rights and homosexual movements. 1 70 Government does not compel
racial integration, but it can encourage integration by education,
exhortation

and

subsidies.

Likewise,

government

cannot

force

individuals into traditional marriages, but it can encourage traditional
marriages by favoring them in various ways.
The logical inconsistency of gay marriage has already become
apparent in litigation over the benefits offered by some employers to
gay couples.

Suits have alleged that denial of these benefits to

1 65 Sunstein, sup-ra note 31, at 1 8 .
1 66 Even gay activists often admit that race and homosexuality are very different with
respect to discrimination. See SULLIVAN, sup-ra note 1 0 1 , at 151-54 (arguing that race is dif
ferent because sexual orientation can be hidden and is a complex "mixture of identity and
behavior;" and because "homosexuals are not subject to inherited and cumulative patterns of
economic discrimination" and " (t]here was no slavery for homosexuals"); see generally Lynn D.
Wardle, Loving v. Virginia and the Coustitutiona.l Right to Marry, 1 79().1 990, 41 HOWARD LJ. 289
( 1 998).
1 67 Luke 1 0:30-37. The Samaritans were a disliked minority. By helping the injured Levite
the Good Samaritan ignored racial distinctions.
1 GB See ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 120-2 1 .

1 69 See Sunstein, supra. note 31, at 20 n.65.
1 70 See Lena Williams, Blacks Rejecting Gay Rights
28, 1 993, at AI .

a.s

a. Battle Equal to Thein, N.Y. TIMES, june
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unmanied heterosexual couples is illegal discrimination . The first few
claims have failed.17 1 However, the arguments for legitimizing same
sex marriage based on equality and sexual p1ivacy and autonomy
would also bar discrimination against unmanied h eterosexual couples.
Certainly any claim that a gay maniage is morally superior or more
beneficial to society than heterosexual cohabitation "\vithout marriage
would strike m ost Americans as ludicrous.

3. If There Is an Equality Problem, Validating Same-Sex Jvlarriage Does Not
Solve It
If maniage laws cause invidious inequality by bestmving benefits on
some but not all people, the j ust solution is n o t to extend those
benefits to gay marriages. That step would still leave discrimination
against polygamy and endogamy and, more importantly, against those
who cannot or choose not to marry. Indeed, many gay activists oppose
recognition of same-sex m aniages because it would deprecate
unmanied gays. 1 7 2 Complete equality would require eliminating any
legal preference for marriage and treating ail individuals alike, regard
less of whether they are manied. That advocates of sam e-sex marriage
do not propose this shows that equality is not their real goal .
C. Recognizing Gay Marriages Would Damage Traditional Maniage
1. Many Advocates ofSarne-Sex Marriage Want to Transform Traditional

Marnage
Many advocates of same-sex marriage seelz not to expand traditional
maniage to gays but revolutionize the instj t11tjon . 1 73 William Esklirlge
hopes gay maniage "\vill dethrone the tradi ti onal family based on
blood-relationships in favor of "families we choose." 1 74 Michaelangelo
1 7 1 See Foray v.

Bell Atlantic, 56 F. Supp 2d. 3 2 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1 999) (denying relief under
Federal statutes). The court concluded that the discrimination was not invidious because gay
couples cannot marry but heterosexual couples can. Jd. at 330. It is doubtful, however, that
most Americans would find this a morally persuasive distinction.

172 Stephen Noll usefully distinguishes between "deconstructionists [who] fear that
marriage may co-opt the [gay] liberation movement, while rcconstructionist.s argue that same
sex marriage may serve as a means by which the entire institution may be redefined." Noll,
supra note 9, at 59. See irifm notes 3 1 0- 1 7 and accompanying text (many gays oppose recog
nition of gay marriage).
1 73 See Nitya Duclos, Some Comf!licaling Thoughts on Same-Sex Maniage,

I LAW & SEXUALITY 3 1

( 1 99 1 ) .

17 4

ESKRIDGE,

supra note 9 , at 8 1 ; see

also KATH WESTON,

FAMILIES WE

CHOOSE: LESBIANS,
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Signorile urges activists "to fight for same-sex marriage and its benefits
and then, once granted, redefine the institution of marriage completely, . . . to debunk a myth and radically alter an archaic institution . . .

.

The most subversive action lesbians and gay men can undertake . . . is
to transform the notion of 'family' entirely." 1 75

Urvashi Vaid wants to

"assimilate the straight world to the gay world." 1 7 6

Although the

consequences of validating same-sex marriage cannot be predicted,
companionate marriage fosters anti-homosexual attitudes 177 and could
therefore be a target of gay activists.
The question of the impact of gay marriage on public attitudes
raises a related question: Why do supporters of gay marriage spurn the
alternative of domestic partnership laws, which could confer the same
legal benefits as marriage? 1 7 8

The reason is that they are interested

primarily in the intangible benefits-the honor, respect, the social

stamp of approval-that legally recognized marriage brings. 179 But the

corollary to recognition would be that traditional child-bearing and
child-rearing marriages would no longer be legally special.

They

would be treated as no better than a gay partnership, which to most
people would constitute not only the denial of a deserved accolade but
a calculated insult.

2. Weakening the Incentives to Marry
Why do couples marry?

A desire to make a mutual commitment,

even in public, is not a reason since that can be done without
marriage.

The material legal benefits of marriage are mostly minor

and often outweighed by the material detriments. 1 80

The main

motives to marry, then, are intangible. Society honors marriage. Law
confirms this honor by recognizing marriage . In judaism, Christianity,
and m any otl1er faiths, marriage is a sacrament, a union blessed by

GAVS, KINSHIP 1 1 6 ( 1 99 1 ) ; Sullivan, supra note 1 0 1 , at 202-05.

175 1£chelangelo Signorile, Bridal Wave, OUT, Dec.:Jan., 1994, at 1 6 1 . See also Franklin
Kameny, Deconslrucling lhe Tra.dilional Family, THE WORLD & I, Oct. 1993, at 393-95. " [T] here is
no legitimate basis for limiting the freedom of the individual to structure his family in
nontraditional ways that he finds satisfying. . . . " !d. at 385.
1 76 URVASHI VAID, VIRTUAL EQUALI1Y: THE MA!NSTREAMING OF GAY AND LESBIAN
LIBERATION 208 ( 1 995 ) .
177 POSNER, supra note 1 , a t 157-58.

1 78 See supra notes 1 3-14 and accompanying text.
179 See supra note 1.

1 80 See supra note 56.
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The religious associations o f m aniage are importan t even to

God.

unbelievers; many who o therwise never e n ter a church or temple still
insist on being married there.

Marriage is "a public traditi o n that car

ries with i t experience and wisdom beyon d the reach of the lifetime of
any single coupl e . " 1 8 1 People follow social nonns because they value
the opinions of others, and law h elps to shape those nonn s . 1 8 2
Marriage is the social norm for adults; singles fi t awkwardly or not at
all into many social settings. Singles are often considered u nfortunate
( "he/she can ' t find a spouse") or psychologically stunted - unmarried
men have been viewed as immature. However, many n o rm s that once
made bachelorhood unattractive for m e n have weakened . 1 33

Society

generally treats a marriage as valid only if i t is legally recognized. Thus
polygam ous and endogamous m arriages are generally honored only i n
societies where such m arriages are legal.
Honor, or social approval, is the main reason why legal recogni tion
of gay maniages is so eagerly sought.
dishonor are powerful incentives.

Desire for honor and fear of

For example, Ame1i cans pay taxes

more readily than most other people, n o t because our penalties for tax
evasion are harsher but because our social customs condemn tax
evasion ; 1 84 elsewhere it is downplayed as illegal but n o t immoral .
People often endure terrible hardship, even brave certain death, to
8
gain or main tain honor.1 5
The honor conferred by law is fragile, however, because i t depends
A tax break can be

on social attitudes as material benefi ts d o not.

extended from one group to others without reducing i ts worth to the
form er, but the award of honor is necessarily selective and j udgmental.
An honor too freely granted l oses value . 1 8 6 If it is gran ted for acts
181

P h i l i p Turner, St!xual Ethics and the Attack

an

Traditiollol Morality 1 9 ( 1 988) (pamphlet

on file with the author) .

1 82 Sec l\1ATJ' RI D LEY

,

THE ORiGiNS OF VIRTUE: HUMAN ]NSTINCJ'S AND THE EVOLUTION OF

COOPERATION 1 8 1-86 ( 1 998) ; Sunstei n ,

supra note 3 1 , at 954. See also sujna n o tes 25-3,1 and

accompanyi n g text ( discussing the "expressive" fun c ti o n of law, i ncluding the bestowing of
honor) .

1 83

See Wax,

sujJra. n o te 1 44, at 666-67 ( describing the demise of these norms) .

184 See E d i t orial,

LoojJlwles

in I. R.S. Iwfarm, N.Y. TIMES, May 26,

1 998,

at

A20 ( t;u compliance

i n America "is far higher than i n many o th e r Western countries") .

1 85

See j AMES M . MCPHERSON, FOR CAUSE AND COMRADES: WHY MEN FOUGHT IN THE CIVIL

WAR 90-103 ( 1 997) (clai m i n g that soldiers on both sides in the Am erican Civil War fought more

for honor than for abstract causes).

185 See WILLIAM j .

GOODE, TI-lE CELEBRATION OF H EROES: PREST I C E AS A CONTROL SYSTEM

4 6--'18 ( 1 978) (prestige is govern e d by laws of supply and d e m an d ) .
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most people condemn, its value will decline more sharply. Thus many
honors are aggressively restricted. A corpse improperly buried at

Arlington National Cemetery is exhumed and expelled, 18 7 and Con
gress enacts a law to limit this honor. 188 An admiral kills himself
because of charges that he wore medals he did not earn. 1 89 Only one
American - Martin Luther King, Jr. - is honored with an annual
national holiday. If these honors were granted liberally, they would be
cheapened, and the impact of the honors on social attitudes and
behavior would be diluted.
Gays themselves recognize the value of exclusion. Although gays try

to force organizers of ethnic parades to include them,19 0 organizers of
gay

parades

sometimes

exclude

transvestites

and

pro-pederasty

groups 1 9 1 because including them would incur contempt for all gays.

Recognition of gay marriage would have the same effect on attitudes
toward marriage generally.
Acknowledging the psychological function of law and honor shows
that those who say that nonrecognition of gay marriage is "irrational"

have a point.192 Soldiers who fight for honor or for a moral cause are
not behaving "rationally" in the sense that the costs of their actions far
exceed the material benefits. The same is true ofvoting. Because one
vote rarely alters the result of an election, not voting is "rational
apathy."193 A democracy, then, needs "irrational" citizens who devote
more effort to studying issues, supporting candidates, and voting, than
a rational weighing of material costs and benefits would warrant.
Democracies encourage this irrationality by trumpeting voting as a
duty and a privilege.

But many people do not vote if they see that

many of their fellow citizens don't bother.

For soldiering, too, social

1 87 See Stephen Barr, Panel Vows to Tightm Rules for Adington B'U1ial: Politica.Uy-Conner.ted Have
l!.age, Chairman Says, WASH . POST,jan. 29, 1998, at A17.
1 88 38 u.s.c. § 2402 ( 1 994) .
189 See Philip Shenon, His Medals Questioned, Top Admiml Kills Hi·mself, N.Y. TIMES, May 1 7 ,
1996, at A3.
1 90 See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 566
( 1 995) (striking down on First Amendment grounds state court order that organizers of St.
Patrick's Day parade allow homosexual advocacy group to participate) .
1 9 1 See Mark Higgins, Gays Put Their P1ide on Parade, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 1 ,
1996, at B 1 (pro-pederasty group excluded from a Seattle "gay pride" march).
1 92 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 1 76-78 (arguing that sexual orientation is "an irrational
classification").
193 See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 260-74 ( 1 957) .
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attitudes are cmcial.

When society denigrates mili tary service, as

happened with Americans in Vietnam, many young men try to avoi d
combat.
Similarly,

m arrying,

staying

married,

and

bearing

children are in any material accounting irrational .
Eskridge

is

right:

society's

privileging

of

and

raising

In that sense,

traditional

marriage

encourages conduct that is in a sense irrational for individuals but
essential to society's well-being. Esloidge denies that legal validation of
marriage confers honor: "the state is n o t a bit choosy about who can

marry." 1 94 This misses the point, and he corrects his own error when

he says: "the state gives its stamp of approval to the insti tution of mar
riage," not "to particular couples."195

But what is the nature of the

ins ti tution which earns social approval?

Eskri dge himself is "choosy;"

he disapproves some polygamous and incestuous m aniages. 1 96
Some support gay maniage precisely because it would change
attitudes toward homosexual i ty general1y. 197

They are probably 1ight

that recognition would change attitudes toward m aniage just as liber
alization of divorce laws did. Marriage, once a sacred bond that could
be broken only with great difficulty and for compelling reasons, can
now be dissolved by either party for any reason or no reason at all.
Not surprisingly, respect for m aniage plummeted.
It does not follow, though, that validating gay m aniage would
enhance regard for homosexual i ty without eroding respect for tradi
tional marriage. Some claim that recognition would "buttress the e thic
of he terosexual marriage, by showing how even those excluded from i t
can wish to model themselves o n i ts shape and s tructure. " 1 98 This defies
belief.

1 9'1

Most .A�mericans oppose recogni ti on of gay marriage, 1 99 and

ESKJULJGE,

supra note 9, at 1 06; sce also id. at 1 05-09.

195 !d. at 1 05.
1 9 6 !d. a t 1'15-S l .
1 9 7 See supra note 1 .

198 SULLIVAN, supra note 99, at 1 1 2 .

1 99

ESKRJDGE,

supra. n o t e 9 , a t 244 n.53 (citing a 1 992 poll ) . Eskridge a d m i ts recognition

would provoke "vociferous, even vi olent resistance by h o m ophobic h e terosexuals."
Iv1 ost Ame ricans disapprove o f h o m osexuality.
( 1 998)

!d. at 8 1 .

See ;'\_L'\N WOLFE, ONE NAT ION , AHER ALL 72-76

(noting that in a survey, seventy percent of the people questioned condemned

h omosexual i ty). Wolfe found the dominant attitude to be:

" [J]f what

they're asking for is for

me, Mr. Ave rage American, to say yes, your life style is the moral equival e n t of m i n e , that I ' m

n o t willing t o d o . " Carey Goldberg, Acceptance of Gay Men and Lesbian\ is Growing, Study Says,
N .Y. TIMES, May 3 1 , 1 998, at A 1 5 . The National Gay and Lesbian Task Force fou n d that "disap
proval of h o m osexuality . . . was still 56 percent in 1 996". !d.
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Baehr v. Lewin led to a
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Constitutional

Amendment that allowed the Hawaii legislature to restrict marriage to
opposite sex couples. 200 Validating gay marriage would break the link
of marriage to the divine, to the miracle of creation of new life, and to
the rich tradition of love and commitment between husbands and
wives.

" [F]or our intimacies to survive they must receive public

recognition and support. "201 Validating gay marriage would dilute this

support and lead to demands that unmarried couples receive the same

legal benefits as spouses. 202

If respect for gay marriage did grow, it would do so at the expense
of traditional religion: "People who reject Christian doctrine on sex . . .
may reject the remainder of Christian doctrine as well . . . . "203 Given
the centrality of religion in fostering individual responsibility and con
cern for others and in resisting such social evils as drug abuse and
crime, 20 4 such abandonment could seriously harm society.
Harvey Fierstein's play,

Torch Song Trilogy,

shows the typical feelings

about gay marriage. After the death of his lover the protagonist tells
his mother that he is "widowing." The outraged mother says: "Are you
trying to compare my marriage with you and Alan? . . . How dare you! .
. . May God strike me dead ! Whatever I did to my mother to deserve a
child speaking to me this way. "205 To most people, gay marriage would
be a "mocking burlesque"206 or "mere parody" of traditional marr

iage. 207 James

Q.

Wilson suspects legal recognition "would call even

more seriously into question the role of marriage at a time when the
threats to it, ranging from single-parent families to common divorces,

have hit record highs."208 Andrew Sullivan, an advocate of same-sex

marriage, admits that " [e] ven those tolerant of homosexuals may find
this institution [marriage] so wedded to the notion of heterosexual

200 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
201 Turner, supra note 182, at 19.
202 See supra text accompanying note 1 87.
203 POSNER, supra note I, at 1 75.

204 See GUENTER LEWY, WHY AMERICA NEEDS RELIGION 1 1 7-21 ( 1 996) .
205 HARVEY FIERSTEIN, TORCH SONG TRILOGY 1 44-46 ( 1979 ) .
20 fi Arkes, supra note 1 1 9, at 45.

207 James Q. Wilson, Against Homosexual Marriage, COMMENTARY, March, 1 996, at 34, 3 6
(quoting Kenneth Minogue's book review o fVirtually Normal) .
20 8 Jd.
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commiullent that t o extend i t would be to undo i ts very essence."209
Some back gay m a11iage despite its uncertain effects: "We ought to
pull the pin and see what h appens."2 1 0 This attitude would strike many
(including the author) as reckless when applied to an institution cen
tral to the condition of socie ty.
Some commentators recall that the widespread and often bitter
opposition to racial integration eroded after World War II and predic t
that hostility to gay marriage will also collapse i f i t is san c tioned.2 1 1
Unfortunately, while racism has sharply declined in recent decades,
considerable racial friction persists. Moreover, as already noted, the
analogy to race is fau1ty. 2 1 2 Jim Crow segregation was a regional
aberration, a deviation from Western tradi tion and from Christian and
Jewish doctrine .

By contrast,

disapproval

of homosexuality and

reverence for tradi tional marriage are in tegral to Western tradition
and Christianity.

Thus a be tter comparison Lh.an racial integration

would be cannibalism or commission of sex acts in public.

Both have

been condoned in some societies but long abhorred in Western
civilization.

It is doubtful that legalizing these acts would rapidly lead

to their public acceptance.

General approval of gay m arriage would

require either an official change in traditional Christian, Jewish, and
Moslem

doctline,

or wholesale

abandonmen t

of these

fai ths by

Americans. Both are highly unlikely.
Revolutionizing

social

attitudes

toward

homosexual i ty

seems

especially unlikely if gay maniage were legally imposed by judges. In
rulings on the death penalty, the rights of criminal defendan ts, racial
preferences, and busing to promote school in tegration, the Supreme
Court took positions far to the left of the American mainstream , b1.1 t
the people were not won over. Indeed, some decisions m ay have galva
nized opposition and thereby reversed a gradual lefh¥ard trend in

209 SULLIVAN, supra note 1 0 1 , at 1 79.
2 1 ° Christine Pierce, Gay j\;Janiage, 2 6 ] .

SOCIAL PI-IlL. no. 2, 5, 1 0 ( 1 995 ) .

Court of Vermont flirted with a similar recklessness i n

Baker v. State,

The Supreme

744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1 999 ) .

While ordering the legislature to extend the same ben efits to gay couples as to married
couples, the court did not insist that m arriage be open to gays because " [a] sudden change in
the marriage laws or the statutory benefits traditionally incidental to marriage may have
disruptive and unforeseen consequences."

Jd.

at 887.

Given this admission, it is astonishing

that the court simply leaves the whole question to the l e gislature.

2 1 1 See

ON THE ROAD TO SAJvlE-SEX MARRIAGE: A SUPPORTIVE GUIDE TO PSYCI-IOLOGICAL,

POLITICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES 1 9<1-96 (Robert P. Cabaj

2 1 2 See S11pra notes

1 63-71 and accompanying text.

& David W. Purcell, eds., 1 998) .
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Unlike the Court's dismantling of Jim Crow

segregation, these decisions did not grow out of but often ran counter
to Western tradition. Gay marriage is so contrary to Western tradition
that the public would probably reject any judicial m ove to condone it.
The effect of validating gay marriage would tum in part on gays'
response to it. Most advocates of gay marriage want it as an option for
gays, not the norm; they do not expect that, for gays, love and mar
riage will go together like a horse and carriage. And why should they?
The purposes of traditional marriage-to rear children, to give
mothers economic support, and to yoke the energies of males to
families-will not apply to gay couples.

Although most lesbians
already live in stable relationships, most gay men do not, 2 1 4 which
suggests that sexual conduct is dictated by deep-seated attitudes toward
fidelity and promiscuity rather than by a marriage certificate.

The
paucity of registrations under Hawaii's domestic partnership law2 1 5
shows that the tangible legal benefits of marriage are unimportant to
most gays. Despite legal recognition, few gay men would marry. The
effect of recognition, then, might be less to elevate esteem for
homosexuality than to diminish regard for marriage.

3. Weakening the Incentives to Stay Married
Recent research documents the carnage wrought by the breakdown
Children were supposed to profit if their
parents' unhappy marriages were dissolved. 2 1 6 We now know that di
of the traditional family.

vorce devastates not only small children, as many expected, but older
children, too, and the damage persists, often for life . 2 1 7 Most divorced

2 1 3 Justice Ginsburg believes that the Court's abortion decisions may have had this effect.
See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 1 85, 1 199-1205 ( 1 99 2 ) .
2 1 4 See infra note 230.

2 1 5 See supra note 57.
2 1 6 "Perhaps the most persuasive justification for unrestricted availability of divorce is the
empirical assumption that if either parent is sufficiently dissatisfied with the marriage to
contemplate divorce, then the child may be more harmed by the continuation of the unhappy
Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Maniage and
marriage than by divorce."
Divorce, 76 VA. L. ru:v. 9 (1990) at 29.
2 1 7 See generally LENORE WEITZMAN, THE D IVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA ( 1 985); JUDITH S.
WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES. MEN, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN: A DECADE
AFTER D IVORCE ( 1 989) ; see also Scott, supra note 2 1 6 at 29-37 (divorce damages children unless
tl1ere is "intense conflict" within the marriage) ; Wax, supra note 1 44, at 6 7 1 (analyzing why and
how divorce is more damaging to women and children than to men).
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women and their children suffer a lower standard of living. 2 1 8
tl1reat of divorce constrains women even during marriage.

The
Many

women hold j obs, for example, not for Lhe needs of the intact family
but for fear of divorce . 2 1 9 No-faul t divorce causes an increase in abuse
of wives by husbands220 and creates uncertainty that discourages cou

ples from having children. 22 1

The impact of divorce on husbands is l ess clear but, given the
benefits of marriage, it is likely that divorce generally leaves men worse
off, too .

Although marriage is generally beneficial and divorce d etri

mental not only to children and society as a whole but also to the par
ties themselves, people often fai l to appreciate this fact.

Accordingly,

society needs to support m arriage. 222
Some supporters of gay m aniage criticize tl1ose who worry m ore
about h omosexuality tl1an about the bigger problem of divorce.223
The oi ticism is valid,224 but it undermines rather t11an advances the
case for gay m arriage because i t would further weaken the disincen
tives to divorce.

The main obj ection to divorce has always been its

damage to children.

Since gays canno t reproduce and rarely adopt,

this obj e ction would not apply to m ost gay m arriages. A second
obj ection

is

often

that divorce

iruures wives

botl1

econom i cally

(because most women earn less than m en ) and socially (because it is
harder for divorced women to remarry tl1an for divorce d men and
because divorced women are less accepted in society than divorced
men) . This obj e c tion would also be invali d for gay couples.
The absence of children and instability of gay relationships vvill

2 18

219

See Sco tt,

supra n o te

2 1 6 , at 33.

See Gene Koretz, Why JV!anied

Women Work,

Bus. WEEK, Sept. 22, 1 997, a t 2 6 (citi n g study

by Allen M. Parkman ) .
22 0

Brinig

& Crafton, supra n o te 48, a t 887-92 (showing a posi tive correlation between the

adoption of n o-faul t divorce and an i ncrease i n spouse abuse ) .

22 1 Jd.

a t 887 ( " [T] here are fewer births per thousand population i n those states that have

adopted a true n o-fault regi m e " ) .

222

The Ramsey Colloquium conn ects this need with the difficulties of rearing children:

"Havi n g and rearing children is among the most difficult of human projects. Men and women
need all the support they can get to mai n tain stable m arriages i n which the next generation
can flourish."

The Homosexual lvlov�:ment: A Re.Jj)(]nse by the Rn.nmy Collvquiwn, supra note

1 05 , at

18. I t can only be added that the difficulties of marriage are n o t l i m i ted to chil d-reari ng.
223
See Stephen A. Macedo, Homosexunlity rmd the Consenm tive Mind, S<J CEO. LJ. 26 1 , 287

&

n.99 ( 1 995 ) .
See

224 111e same point is made by some who defend the family and criticize tl1e homosexual movement
The Homosexua.[ Movement: 11 Resj;onse by the RnmsLy Colloquium, supm n o te l 05, a t 1 6 .
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mean higher divorce rates for gay couples. 225
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Indeed, many of its

advocates do not expect or want gay marriages to be permanent. In
weddings of the Metropolitan Community Church, the largest sect
dedicated to gays, couples vow to stay together "so long is there is
love," 226 not "until death us do part." 227 A wedding sanctifies marriage,
conveys its solemnity, and calls the community to support the couple.
The formality of a marriage license both underscores the gravity of
marriage and protects spouses (especially the weaker party-usually
the wife) by clarifying and recording their status. Given the instability
of gay marriages, it is not surprising that some of its advocates criticize
the very requirement of a wedding ceremony and license and the legal
recognition of marriage. 228
Validating gay marriage would encourage adultery. Sexual fidelity

is rare among gay men. 229 Andrew Sullivan cheers that gays' "need for
225 See POSNER, supra. note 1 , at 305-{)6 (instability of gay relationships) .
226 ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 194 (quoting the vows taken in such ceremonies). This atti
tude belies the claim voiced by Andrew Sullivan that recognizing gay m arriage would stabilize
gay relationships. SULLNAN, supra. note 1 0 1 , at 202; see also Christensen, supra. note 1, at 1 726
(conceding uncertainty whether marriage has "the same meaning-entailing commitment to
the same values-for gay people as for their heterosexual counterparts").
22 7 THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER 302 (Seabury Press 1976) . The difference is telling i n
one other respect. In Christianity and Judaism o n e ought to love one's spouse; ceasing to do s o
is a fault o n e should try t o correct. The gay ceremony posits n o such duty; the commitment
ceases when love ends, for whatever reason.
22 8 See Mohr, supra. note 6, at 229-30 (calling the requirement of a ceremony "misguided"
and calling gay marriage superior because it is not automatically sanctified) . Mohr says: "until
recently, by far the most usual form of marriage in western civilization [was] common law mar
riage-in which there is no marriage license or solemnization." Id. at 230. Until recently,
however, most people were peasants who lacked the capability, and often, the legal right to
leave a small village, so i nformal marriages were usually stable. If they did dissolve, the law
cared little because the demands of child-rearing are lower in agrarian societies and feudal
societies cared little about peasant marriages. See genera.Uy MARY ANN GLENDON, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW (1989).
22 9 See DENNIS ALTMAN, THE HOMOSEXUALIZATION OF AMERICA, THE AMERICANIZATION OF
THE HOMOSEXUAL 1 87 ( 1 982) (" [A]mong gay men a long-lasting monogamous relationship is
almost unknown." ) ; DAVID P. MCWHIRTER & ANDREW M. MATTISON, THE MALE COUPLE: HOW
RELATIONSHIPS D EVELOP 285 ( 1984) (finding that "sexual exclusivity . . . was not the ongoing
expectation for most" male couples); Leon McCusick et aL, AIDS and Sexual BehavioT Rep01·ted by
Gay Men in San Francisco, 75 AM. ] . PUBLIC HEALTH 493, 493-95 ( 1 985) (reporting that their
1 985 s tudy revealed that substantial percentages of gay men were not involved in monogamous
relationship).
The renowned expert on human sexuality, Dr. David Reuben, offers this explanation for
the promiscuity of gay men: "Homosexuals are trying the impossible: solving the problem with
only half the pieces. They say they want gratification and love but they eliminate, right from
the start, the most obvious source of love and gratification - woman." Thomas Vinciguerra,
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extramarital outlets" will make adultery more acceptable for all
married couples.230 He condemns the "baleful . . . attempt" to impose
"a stifling model of heterosexual normality."231 If same-sex marriages
were made legally and socially equal, these attitudes would spread to
traditional marriages.
The law could . set separate divorce standards for traditional and
same-sex marriages, but that would contradict the principle of gay
activists that the two are equal.

Since the main objections to divorce

do not apply to gay marriages, a unified standard would inevitably drift
toward easier divorces.
Moreover, the case for gay marriage rests
largely on the argument for autonomy in intimate matters.232 In this
view, society has no right to define marriage; it must only validate
individuals' choices.

But if the right to autonomy forbids society to

limit the creation of marriage, it also forbids society to limit the
termination of marriage. A right to marriage on demand also implies
a right to divorce on demand.
Recognizing gay marriages would also dilute the social stigma of

divorce. Divorce is discouraged not only by legal obstacles but also by
the likely disapproval of relatives, neighbors, and friends at work and
in church.

This disapproval reflects popular belief that divorce is

damaging, especially to wives and children, and that marriage is a
sacred commitment not to be casually broken. These attitudes do not
apply to gay marriages.
alike

Thus, treating gay and traditional marriages

would further dilute the stigma of

divorce.

As Barbara

Whitehead puts it: "Once the social metric shifts from child well-being
to adult well-being, it is hard to see divorce and nonmarital birth in

anything but a positive light."233

More generally, marriage loses its value as a standard form if it must
cover many kinds of relationships.234 In particular, legitimizing gay
Evi!7ything Yau Ever Wanted to Know About Changing With the Times, N.Y. TIMES, March 2 1 , 1 999, §
4, at 7 (quoting DAVID REUBEN, EVERYfHING YOU ALWAYS WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT SEX
142 ( 1969) ) .
230 SULLIVAN, supra. note 1 0 1 , a t 202. Richard Mohr also praises gay male couples for
realizing that sexual fidelity is not necessary to show their love for each other and advocating
that ·in this respect, inter alia, gay male couples may "provide models and materials for
rethinking family life and improving family law." Mohr, supra note 6, at 233.
23 1 Sullivan, supra note 1 0 1 , at 203; see also Peter Freiberg, Some Gays A n,n 't Wedded to the
Idea ofSame-Sex Maniage, THE ADVOCATE 530, no. 16 ( 1989) .
232 See supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.

2 33 Whitehead, supra. note 66, at 52.
234 See generally Douglas Allen, An Inqui·1y into the State's Role in Maniage, 13 J. ECON. BEHAV.
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marriage would damage traditional families by promoting "an ideology
of 'recreational' sexuality that divorces sex from marital unity and
treats marital infidelity as a relatively unimportant matter. "235

D. Recognizing Same-Sex Marriage Would Harm the Vast Majority of Women
Mlho Want Traditional Marriages
Legitimizing same-sex marriage would harm women more than
men.

Homosexuality is more common among men than women.236

Condoning same-sex marriage and homosexuality would remove more
men than women from the market for traditional marriage.

That

market already has more women than men for several reasons,
including higher mortality, homosexuality, incarceration, and drug
addiction rates among men, and greater reluctance of suitable men to
seek marriage.

The disparity is widest in inner cities.237

It prevents

some women who want a spouse from finding one. Further, a surplus
of a commodity depresses its market value.

The relative surplus of

unmarried women strengthens the bargaining power of men, who can
demand one-sided terms of courtship or simply forego maniage
altogether because the surplus of single women enables them to
obtain what they want from a woman without the burdens of marriage.
The surplus of single women also harms married women by en
abling a divorced man to find a new spouse more easily than a di
vorced woman can.

This increases the bargaining power of married

men, who can more credibly threaten to divorce and re-marry than
can their wives.

Because there are more homosexual men than

women, recognition of same-sex marriages would aggravate these
problems by increasing the imbalance between men and women
seeking traditional marriages, thereby undermining sexual equality.

E. Recognizing Same-Sex Marriages Would Logically Require Several Other

Changes in the Law
To repeat: Same-sex marriage is not singled out for non-recognition

& 0RG. 1 7 1 ( 1 990).

235 Amitai Etzioni & Robert P. George, ViTlue and the Stale: A Dialngue Between a
Communilarian and a Social Consemalive, REsPONSIVE COMMUNI1Y., Spring, 1999, at 54, 65
(statement by Robert P. George).
23fi POSNER, supra note 1, at 99.
237 See id. at 136-41 .
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i n our law; many other forms of marriage-polygamy, endogamy, and
bestiality-are invalid or even forbidden. Rather, traditional m arriage
Argum ents for approving gay
is singled out for endorsement.
marriage apply at least as strongly to these other forms, and arguments
against the others apply at least as strongly to gay marriage. The
arguments for gay marriage also support cloning, and arguments
against cloning also oppose gay marriage. If we condone gay mar
riage, then, we must also condone the other arrangements; if we rej ect
the others, we must also rej ect gay marriage.
1. Polygamy

Gay actiVIsts champion autonomy in intimate relationships2 3 8 and
charge that tradi tionalists simply fear what is different and mindlessly
mouth religious prejudice. 239 On these grounds polygamy is even easi
er to support because, unlike gay maniage, i t has been and still is
condoned by many religions and societies. 24 0 The Equal Protection
argument for same-sex marriage also applies to polygamy. The ban on
polygamy discriminates not only against religions that approve
polygamy but also bisexuals, who cannot act on their sexual preference
·within marriage unless they can have multiple spouses. It is not sur
prising, then, that some commentators link the argum ents for same
sex m arriage and polygamy. 2 4 1 As Hadley Arkes says, "Every argument
for gay marriage is an argum ent that would support polygamy. "2 4 2
23 S See supra notes 1 25-30 and accompanying text.
239 See infra notes 295-96 and accompanying text.

2'10
In non-Western societies polygamy is the norm. POSNER, supra note 1, at 69. Unlike
homosexuality, polygamy is not even condemned in the Bibl e but was practiced by the ancient
Hebrews. See jAMES A. BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX, AND CHRJSTIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE 5�
( 1 987) ; Noonan, s·upra note 62, at 32. 'Western Jews practiced polygamy until about A.D. 1 000,
Eastern jews until well into the twentieth century." POSNER, supra note 1, at 49.

2'11 See Chambers, snjJra note 1 , at 489-9 1 (supporting legalization of polygamy) . Leaders
of the 1 993 gay march on Washington drafted a platform that included a d e m and for "legaliza
tion of multiple paru1 er unions." See Texas Pla tform Agreement }in Next Year's Ma:rch, WASI-l .
BLADE, May 22, 1 992. In I 972 the National Coalition of Gay Organizations demanded " [r] e
peal of all legislative provisions that restrict the sex or number of persons entering into a
marriage unit." ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 54 (quoting the National Coalition of Gay
Organizations' 1 972 d e m ands for law reforms); see also PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED
STORJES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES 238-41 ( 1 997) . Richard Posner sees a positive
correlation between acceptance of polygamy and rates of hom osexual activity. He seems to
believe that causation runs from the former to the latter. POSNER, supra note 1 , at I 36.

242 One Man, One Woman, WASHINGTON WATC!-!, Jan. 26, 1 99 8 , at 1 (containing statement
by Hadley Arkes) . This point is conceded by some advocates of gay marriage. See Carlos A.
B al l , !'vioral Fo-undatiow for a Discourse on Sam<"Sex Maniage: Loa/ring Beyo·nd Political Libera.lism, 85
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Laws against polygamy can be defended only with reasoning that
also excludes same-sex marriage. In practice, polygamy usually means
polygyny, which allegedly denies equality to women. At first blush this
. . . charge seems strange. Adding women to a law partnership or a college
faculty is deemed to raise women's status. Why does not adding more
women to a marriage do the same?

The answer is that, unlike a law

firm or faculty, marriage in our society is viewed as a unique personal,
emotional, and sexual commitment between a man and a woman
which would be diluted and distorted by polygamy.243 This reasoning
makes a normative judgment about marriage that also precludes gay
marriages. If we eschew moral j udgments in favor of value neutrality
and individual autonomy, we can condone gay marriage but must also
accept polygamy. To insist that gay marriages be monogamous would
not only deny autonomy but also impose a normative j udgment for
which there is no basis in policy or in our society's traditions-that two
men (or women) can marry, but that three men (or women) cannot
marry.
Polygamy could not be limited to gays.

Once the total ban on

polygamy is breached, it would be inconsistent to forbid polyandry or
marriages of equal numbers of men and women (such as a four-way
marriage of two men and two women). Moreover, proponents of gay
marriage want it treated the same as traditional marriage. That would
preclude polygamy for gays only.

Further, while recognizing gay

marriages would aggravate the scarcity of marriageable men, polygamy
would relieve this problem by reducing the numerical disparity
between single men and women. Thus validating gay marriage would
also increase the social need for polygamy.
Monogamy encourages a man to care for his wife (because he can
have only one) and children (because he is likely to have fewer
children than a polygynist) .244 Monogamy also protects weaker men by
preventing stronger men from accumulating harems.

Monogamy

imposes a rule of one-to-a-customer, even though polygyny might be
favored not only by alpha males but also by women who would prefer
sharing a strong husband to sole possession of a weak one or to having
GEO. LJ. 1 871 , 1 878-79 ( 1997 ) ; David L. Chambers, Polygamy and Same-Sex Mmriage, 26 H OF
STRA L. REV. 53, 79-82 ( 1 997) ; Chai Feldblum, A Progressive Moral Case Jar Same-Sex Marriage, 7
TEMP. POL. & CN. RTS. L. REV. 485, 490 ( 1998 ) .
243 See Teresa Stanton Collett, Recognizing Same-Sex Maniage: Asking for the Impossible?, 4 7
CATH. U. L. REV. 1 245, 1 256 ( 1 998) .
244 See POSNER, supra. note 1 , at 95, 2 1 6, 258.

630

[Vol.XV: 5 8 1

jow-nal of Law & Politics

n o husband a t all. 245
Efforts by proponents of gay marriage to distinguish polygamy are
unpersuasive

and

sometimes

laughably

William

disingenuous.

Eskridge waxes eloquent about the threat polygamy poses to the
companionship between husband and wife,246 but after this encomium
he drops an endnote disclaiming any position on polygamy among
gays. 247

His reticence is not surprising since any discrimination

between gay and heterosexual polygamy would be i mpossible
square with his insistence on "formal equality."248

to

He is numb to the

uniqueness of the relationship between husband and wife that de
mands monoga..-ny for u"lem but not for gays or business partnerships.
Even if polygamy statistically increases certain problems, not all
polygamous m aniages would be troublesome.

Thus a total prohi

bition of polygamy requires the kind of generalizing that Esluidge
otherwise condemns.

Consider, for example, a man who m arries two

wives in a country that perm i ts polygamy and who then immigrates to
Arn e1ica, where he must abandon Lhe second wife or be guil ty of a

crim e . Viewing the case alone, this result seems harsh and pointless 
who is harmed by allowing this one exception?
Lricky,

Lhough, and pushes

M aking exceptions is

the law onto a slippery slope. If an

immigrant may keep two wives, why not three, or twen ty-five? What if
an American takes a second wife abroad and then re turns?
Some may sincerely consider polygamy a good m odel for o th ers,
just as proponents see gay marriage as a positive m odel . Many people,
however, view polygamy and gay marriage as contradicting the ideal of
the traditional, companionate

( i. e.,

monogamous) , h e terosexual mar

riage . Legislation is a blunt instrument; i t employs general rules cover
ing broad categories, not individual, ad hoc decisions.

Inevi tably,

then, it is ei tl1er underinclusive or ove1inclusive . As America becomes
more diverse, we must decide whether to retain or abandon va1ious
legal tradi tions not shared by new immigrants. For example, P.Jnerica
has a rapidly growing number of Moslems,2 4 9 who condone and may

245 Some proponents of gay marriage acknowledge this as a possible argument in favor of
polygyny. See Macedo, supra note 224, at 288 n . 1 05; s ee a./so POSNER, supra note 1 , at 94.
24 6 ESKRIDGE, supra. note 9, at 1 4 8-49.
2 47 ld. at 253 n.56.
248 ld. at 5 1 , 1 22.

249 See A Crescent for a Cross: Islam Prospers in America,

CHRIST!ANI1Y TODAY, Oct.

28, 1 99 1 , at
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support legalization of polygamy. 250

We can hardly cling to a Chris

tian, Eurocentric tradition of monogamy if we desert the universal
tradition against gay marriage.

This does not mean that polygamists

must be rigorously hunted down and prosecuted. It may be sufficient
to protect society's legitimate interest in monogamy that polygamy be
tolerated but not validated; indeed, this seems to be the evolving

attitude toward polygamy. 25 1

It is the same attitude that now prevails

toward gay marriage.

2. Endogamy
Western law has long banned endogamy. 252

Again, the main

arguments for endorsing gay marriage - individual autonomy in
intimate affairs and validation of loving relationships - also apply to
endogamy. The main obj ection to endogamy - that it causes genetic
defects-is scientifically feeble. 253

Moreover, "we do

not forbid

[unrelated] people who are carrying the same dangerous recessive

gene to marry each other. " 254 If the physical health of offspring were
society's central goal, there are many steps that could be, but are not,
taken that would be more effective than laws against endogamy.
Moreover, the rule bars marriage of many people who are not blood
relatives - such as a parent and an adopted child.

Clearly, fear of

birth defects was not the original reason for the taboo, but is a post
hoc rationalization. Validating gay marriages would further eviscerate
the

birth-defect

argument

against

endogamy

since

homosexual

couples do not reproduce.
This prohibition is harder to defend than the nonrecognition of
gay marriage.

Homosexuality does not appeal to most people, 255 but

250 See Dirk Johnson, Polygamists Eme1ge from Secm:y, Seeking Not just Peace, But Respect, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 9, 1 99 1 , at A22.
25 1 See Chambers, supra note 243, at 71 (polygamy is now rarely prosecuted) .

252 See JACK GOODY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAMILY AND MARRIAGE IN EUROPE 31-33
( 1 983) (describing gradual suppression of endogamy as power of Christianity grew in Europ e ) ;
C. MORRIS, THE PAPAL MONARCHY: THE WESTERN CHURCH FROM 1 050 T O 1 250 331 ( 1 989)
(describing break u p of close knit clans and dispersal of property caused by the church's ban
on endogamy) .

253 See Carolyn S. Bratt, Incest Statutes and the Fundamental Right of Marriage: Is Oedipus Free to
Marry?, 18 FAM. L.Q. 257, 267-81 ( 1 984) (calling the genetic case against endogamy weak) .
Even some courts admit that the genetic objection to endogamy is weak. See Bucca v. State, 1 28
A.2d 506, 5 1 0 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1957) .
254 POSNER, supra note 1 , at 200.
255 See supra note 1 54.
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incest was common i n p1imitive societies. Indeed, Freud called the
taboo on incest the greatest wound inflicted on the id by civilization. 2 56
The argument that same-sex marriage is opposed only because i t is
different from the norm and contrary to religious prejudices applies
even more forcefully to endogamy. 2 57
The taboo on endogamy is good policy. It stabilizes fam ilies by
avoiding the friction that would arise between husband and wife and
between parents and siblings when a parent and child m arry. This
rationale does not apply to endogamous gay marriages since gays bear
no children to m arry. If endogamous gay marriages were permi tted,
though, tl1e principle of equality would require acceptance of endoga
mous heterosexual marriages.
Bans on gay m arriage and endogamy require a degree of otherness
or diversity in marriage. Endogamy promotes allegiance to family,
clan or tribe, not to the larger society. Christi anity banned endogamy
in order to weaken clan ties in favor of devotion to one God and one
church . 258 Gay activists accuse their opponents of fearing what is dif
ferent, but heterosexuality and exogamy botl1 push us fi-om tl1e famil
iar toward the different-another family, the o ther sex and children .
In this way exogamy and heterosexuality resemble publi c education, by
which government also encourages ( and to some extent requires)
exposure to the world outside ourselves.
Efforts to tum people outward may be justified on fairly mundane,
pragmatic grounds-in teraction with a variety of people gives citizens
a better understanding of and concern for soci ety and i ts challenges.
Again , the Ramsey Colloquium speaks eloquently:
Human society requires that we learn to value dif
ference within communi ty. In the com plemen tarity of
male and female we find the paradigmatic instance of
[It] invites us to learn to accept and af
this t<'<-lL� . .
firm the natural world from which we are too often
alienated.
Moreover, in the creative complementari ty of male
and female we are directed toward community with
those unlike us. In the community between m ale and
.

.

2 56 SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS <1 ]
257 See Bratt, supra note 254
25 8 See supm n o te 253.

(defending endogamy) .

Qoan Riviere trans., 1 982 ) .
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female, we do not and cannot see in each other mere
reflections of ourselves.

In learning to appreciate this

most basic difference, and in forming a marital bond,
we take both difference and community seriously. 259
This complementarity can also be justified as an end in itself-that
is, that interaction with others different from ourselves is good in itself,
part of human flourishing. 260
William Eskridge's ambivalent discussion of exogamy is instructive.
He

admits

that exogamy may be

desirable

because

it

requires

"reach [ing] beyond" one's own family, 26 1 but he does not ask whether

heterosexuality may be a desirable "reaching beyond" one's own
gender.
"tentative"

Predictably
and

then,

declaring

he

hedges,

calling

himself "open

this justification

to

the argument" that
restrictions on endogamy are unconstitutional. 262 Not surprisingly,
some domestic partnerships laws are open to close relatives. 263

3. Artificial Reproduction and Baby-Selling
Arguments for gay marriage based on equality and reproductive
freedom also apply to artificial reproduction.

Not surprisingly, this is

now a civil rights issue for many homosexuals. 26 4 Gays can reproduce
only by artificial means. If gay marriages become valid, equality and

259 The Homosexual Movement: A Response by the Ramsey Colloquium, supra note 1 05, at 1 7.
26° Friendship, mutual affe ction, and a desire for justice are values that involve relations
with others and that many philosophers have considered intrinsically good. See CAMBRIDGE
DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 830 (Robert Audi, ed., 1995).
26 1 ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 1 5 1 .

262 !d.
263 See 31 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C-4 (Michie Supp. 1999) (listing requirements for
status of "reciprocal beneficiaries," which do not exclude close relatives); 31 HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 572C-2 (Michie Supp. 1999) (listing findings of the state legislature which include
"individuals who are related to one another" as covered by the law) .
264 See Christopher Rapp, Gay Clones, HETERODOXY, May, 1997, at 4 (describing efforts of
the Clone Rights United Front). Laurence Tribe has recognized the connection between
cloning and gay rights, including gay marriage. See Laurence H. Tribe, Second Thoughts on
Cloning, N.Y. TI MES, Dec. 5, 1 997, at 31; see also John A. Robertson, Emb1yos, Famt'lies and
Procreative Liberty: The Legal Sl'ructure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 960 ( 1 986)
("[T]he couple's interest i n reproducing is the same, no matter how conception occurs, for the
values and interests underlying coital reproduction are equally present."). The Vermont
Supreme Court cited the use of "assisted-reproductive techniques" by gay couples to justifY
their right to the same legal benefits as traditional married couples. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d
864, 881 (Vt. 1999 ) .
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autonomy could require that gays b e allowed to u s e artificial reproduc
tion , which will then become common, vvith consequences tl1at are
hard to predict but may be dire .
President Clinton has forbidden the use of federal m oney for
human cloning,265 and some states outlaw cloning altogetl1 er. 266 Such
laws are harder to defend

than

the invalidity of gay m arriages,

polygamy, and endogamy. There is no legal tradition against cloning.
Much condemnation of cloning comes from religious figures or car
ries religious overtones (such as warnings agoinst humans playing
God) .

Thus opponents of cloning, like opponents of polygamy,

endogamy, and gay marriage, can be charged with imposing their ovm
religious beliefs on others. 2 67 Unlike polygamy, cloning cannot b e
called degradin g t o women. 268 Unlike endogamy, i t cannot be said to
cause birtl1 defects.
The gender equality argument for gay marriage26 9 is at leas t as valid
Sexual reproduction forces humans i n to

for cloning.

classes-men are fathers, women are mothers.

two rigid

Even vvitl1 artificial

insemination of a lesbian, a supposedly anonymous sperm donor
might be iden tified and assert rights as a father. Artificial insemination
is even more problematic for gay men , who must find an egg donor
and a gestational (or birtl1) rn o tl1er, who may be different people,
both of whom could assert legal 1ights over the child. Cloning permits
people to break free of these sex-based categories.
Like polygamy and endogamy, human cloning can be opposed on
secular grounds, but these

grounds also weigh against sam e-sex

marriage. First, every child needs both a mother and a father, not only
because two parents are better than one,2 7 0 but also because children
need intimate contact wi th both halves of humanity, female and male.
Even with natural reproduction, death , divorce or abandonment may

265 See Remarks Announcing the Prohibition on Federal Fundingfor the Cloning of Hu7!lan Beings
aud an Exchange With Reports, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 278 (Mar. 10, 1 99 7 ) .
266 See, e.g.,

C a l . Health

& Safety C o d e § 24185 (West Supp. 2000) ( i mposing five-year

moratorium on cloning) .

267 See

Tribe,

supm

n o te

265 (condem n i n g the invocation of "vague n o ti o ns of what is

'natural'" to support the use of the law to outlaw clon ing) .

268

Cloning can be degrading to women if women's self-esteem and status in soci e ty

depend in part on th eir unique ability to bear children.
argues against legitimizing gay m arriages, which are sterile.

2 69 See mpm notes 1 3 2-52 and accompanying text.
2 70 Se1! supr a notes 66-74 and accompanying text.

If they do, though, this fac t also
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deprive a child of one or both parents.

But unlike natural repro

duction, cloning and same-sex marriage guarantee that a child will n o t
have both a mother and a father.

Cloning can also b e opposed a s

contrary t o the principle o f exposing people t o others different from
themselves. 27 1 However, this principle also contradicts gay marriage .
Moreover, the issue o n cloning i s a criminal prohibition, which
requires stronger justification than mere nonrecognition, as is the case
with same-sex marriage. 272
Most important, cloning and other artificial means of reproduction

threaten to undermine human freedom and dignity. 273 In the Westem

tradition all people are "endowed by our Creator with certain rights . "
Manufactured anthropoids, like Frankenstein's creature, are shunned
as monsters.

Some artificial reproduction is tolerated because it is

used primarily when a physical defect in a spouse prevents natural
reproduction. Exceptions, like artificial insemination of lesbians, have
been too rare to attract much criticism.

Cloning would be a radical

change - reproduction where there is no defect in a spouse, or when
there is no spouse at all.
Validating gay marriage would make artificial reproduction more
frequent and visible and provoke more obj ections.

For a same-sex

couple to manufacture a child with no intention that it have both a
mother and a father might be considered child abuse, just as polygamy
has sometimes been judged inherently abusive to children. 274

Even

the time-honored practice of adoption creates emotional problems for
children. 275 Artificial reproduction by gay couples could inflic t greater
27 1 See supra notes 1 1 7 & 254 and accompanying texl.
272 See supra note 1 24 and accompanying text.
273 See Clarke D. Forsythe, Human Cloning and the Constitution, 32 VAL. U. L. REv. 469, 53536 ( 1 998) ; see also LEON R. KASS & JAMES Q. WILSON, THE ETHICS OF HUMAN CLONING ( 1998 ) ;
Leon R. Kass, Why We Should Ban the Cloning ofHuman Beings, 4 TEX . REV. L. & POL. 4 1 ( 1 999) .
274 See In re State ex rei. Black, 283 P.2d 887 (Utah 1 955) (finding child neglect solely
because of parents' polygamy). Recently a woman had sperm retrieved from her husband 30
hours after he died. The sperm was frozen for 15 months, then injected into the woman, who
conceived and bore a child. Alexander M. Capron, professor of law and medicine and co
director of the Pacific Center for Health Policy and Ethics at the University of Southern Cali
fornia, asked: "Is it appropriate to consciously bring a child into this world with a dead father?"
A Birth Spurs Debate on Using Sp!?lm Afiu Death, N.Y. TIMES, March 27, 1999, at All. The same
question can be raised about bringing a child into the world with no father, living or dead. See
supm notes 67-74 on the importance of having both a mother and a father.
275 See Frank C. Verhulst et aL, Pmblem Behavior in International Adoptees: I. An Epidemiological
Study, 29 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCH. 94 ( 1 990) (parents report more problem
behavio r in adopted than in non-adopted children) .
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psychic harm. Further, manufactured children may not b e accepted as
fully human. Although manufactured people are gene tically human, i t
would b e hard for m any people to treat

1 ,000

clones from one person

as n atural human beings.
Artificial reproduction could erode agape-the unselfish Jove for all
humanity. In the West, agape stems from Judea-Christian reverence for
the miracle of life created by God through the union of a woman and
a man .

Philosophers h ave long recognized that seeing others as like

ourselves is a n ecessary condition to altruism . 276

If many people are

churned out i n laboratories, this reverence may evaporate.

To "Jove

t.hy neighbour as t.�yself'277 and to "do unto o thers as you would have
them do unto you"278 may cease to be aspirations if m any of our neigh
bors come from a test tube.279
Condoning

gay

marriages

would

also

militate

against

l aws

forbidding the sale of babies since these laws discriminate against gay
couples, who cannot reproduce n aturally.
selling inflicts no direct, proximate harm

Like gay maniage, baby
and laws against i t are

t.l-:l erefore irrati onal from a mateJialist per.srJective.
concedes

that

baby-selling

considers that desirable.28 0

would

cause

Richard Posner

"commodificati o n , "

but

Posner does n o t consi der how humans'

self-image would change· if marriage were severed from procreation
and children were gene tically designed for marketability in labora
tories and then auctioned to the highest bidder. 2 8 1

276

See generally D AVI D

FlUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN N.'\TUIU: (Ernest Mossner, e d . 1 969)

( 1 8 8 8 ) ; ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF JVJORAL SENTIMENTS (D.D. Rap hael &

A.L.

l'vlacfie, eds.

1 976) ( 1 759) .
277

27 8

Leviticus 1 9 : 1 8 (King james ) ; Matthew 1 9 :1 9 (Kingjam es) .
The ful l quote is: "whatsoever ye would that men sh ould d o to you, do ye even so to

them . . . . " Matthew 7 : 1 2 (King jam es) .

279

The religious and ethical argum ents against cloning are summarized in NAT' L

BIOETHICS A.DVJSORY COMM ' N , CLONING HUMAN BEINGS 39-83 ( 1 997) .

2 80

POSNER,

supra note 1, at 409- 1 6 (arguing that because "the 'purchasers' ge t no more

power over the baby than natu ral parents have over their chi ldren," the commodity that would
be sold if baby-selling was permitted "is not the baby but the natural m o th e r's righ t to keep the
baby") .

2 8 1 See

David

Frum,

Dispatches & Dialogues,

SLATE

(Mar.

1 7,

1 997) ,

<h ttp:/ /www.slate.msn.com/Dialogues2/97-03-l 1 /Dialogucs.asp?i msg=3 ("Gay

avai lable
marriage

at
is

maybe not the very last step to the transformation of children into c o m m o d i ties. B u t i t's close
to the last.") .
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4. Bestiality) etc.
Like

incest and

polygamy,

and

unlike

relations are a crime in most states. 282
taboo is hard to discern.

homosexuality,

bestial

A materialist defense of this

I t cannot be the protection of animals,
which, after all, can be killed for food or clothing. 2 83 Bestiality poses

less of a threat than does homosexuality to spread disease or to divert

people from socially constructive conduct.

Moreover, many people

love their pets and might like to marry them even if they do not want
sex with the pet.
Bestiality and homosexuality can be differentiated in conventional
morality.

Many cultures have accepted at least some homosexual

conduct, but few have accepted bestiality.

In the West homosexuality

is now grudgingly tolerated in general, but bestiality is considered
-revolting, degrading to humans, an offense human dignity. Advocates
of gay marriage, however, reject conventional morality, including any
restriction of sexual freedom imposed simply because society considers
an act disgusting or degrading. If one invokes this principle to support
gay marriage, there is no honest basis for rejecting marriage with ani
mals.
Arguments for gay marriage also raise questions about other
forbidden sexual acts which inflict no immediate, tangible harm , such
as necrophilia, nudity and performance of sex acts in public, and
exposing children to pornography.

Most people suspect that these

acts cause harm, just as they suspect that legitimizing gay marriages
would cause harm; but proving a compelling state interest would be at
least as hard in the former cases as in the latter.

5. Child Marriage

William Eskridge defends minimum age laws for marriage, 2 8 4 but
this position, too, clashes with his arguments for gay marriage. He says
"adolescents are immature decision makers" and "are prone to bad

decisions. " 2 85 However, minimum age laws vary from state to state, 286
though maturation does not vary by state. Given Eskridge's claim that
282 See John E. Theuman, Annotation, Validity of Statutes Making Sodomy a Criminal Offense,
20 A.L.R. 4th 1 009, 1 032-41 ( 1 983).
2 83 See POSNER, supm note 1 , at 230-3 1 .
2 84 See ESKRIDGE, supm note 9, at 1 46-47.
285 !d. at 1 47.
2 86 !d. at 1 46.
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t h e right to marry is trumped only by a compelling state in terest, and
since states with lower age laws h ave experienced no catastrophe, there

can be no compelling need for anything but the l owest m inimum age

laws.

Esluidge says adolescents "are prone to bad decisions," but he offers
no proof of this claim as to marriage. Given the instability of gay male
couples, 287 i t is unlikely that adolescent marriages would be less
successful.

Absent contrary proof, how can there be a constitutional

right of m arriage for gays but not for adolescents? Even if a statistical
difference in favor of gay marriage could be shown, it would only be

the lund of generalization that Eshidge opposes as a basis for law

m aking.

For exat11ple, he rej ects a distinction between gay and

tradi tional marriage based on reproduction because some traditional
m arried couples are sterile. 288 By this reasoning, adolescent marriage
cannot be denied simply because some adolescen ts lack m atmity;
clearly some adolescents are mature and some adults are i m m at�ure.
Minimum age laws can be vindicated only on grounds that also
apply to gay m arriages.

The desire of two ( or m o re ) people to marry

does not always trump society's interest in marriage as an institution

for child-rearing and socialization.

The law may justly prefer that

adolescen ts acquire education and job skills before they m arry so that
they can properly care for their children .

Not all adolescents will so

use tl1is time, and some will conceive children out of wedlock, but
tl1ese facts do not invalidate tl1e general rule. Ratl1er, given the role of
marriage as an aspirational m odel, the law may properly require a
minimum age for marriage.

Since reasonable people can disagree

about the proper minimum age, state laws may vary. Similarly, society

may

legi timately

decide

that

i ts

interests

in

child-rearing

and

socialization are best served by preserving tl1e traditional m odel of
marriage which excludes same-sex marriage.

6. Conclusion

Advocates of same-sex marriage profess to champion "families we

choose," but most defend restrictions on maniage and reproduction

that are in principle indistinguishable from same-sex marriage and
that would, therefore, probably collapse if same-sex maniages were

recognized .

287 See supra n o t e 230 and infra note 305.
288 ESIUU DGE, mpm n o te 9, a t 96-98.
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F. Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage Would Trigger Demands for Religious

Exemptions
Legally recognized marriages are not only treated specially by
govemment but are also required by law to be treated in certain ways
by private parties. For example, employers must grant certain benefits
to married employees. 2 8 9 Obeying such laws for gay marriages would
violate

the

religious

beliefs

exemption from these laws.

of many

citizens,

who would

seek

Indeed, this has already happened.

Recently San Francisco required municipal contractors to extend
certain benefits to same-sex partners of employees. 2 90 The Catholic
diocese objected that its compliance would tacitly endorse homosexual
acts in contradiction of the church's tenets. The dispute was resolved
when the church agreed to let unmarried employees designate a loved
one to receive benefits.

Since the designee could be a relative or

friend without being a gay partner, this policy satisfied the law without

implying approval of homosexual acts. 29 1

Although this conflict was finessed, similar spats would not always
be resolved to mutual satisfaction.

Religious objectors probably have
no constitutional right to relief from such laws. 29 2 However, some
states have religious freedom laws that exempt citizens from laws that
violate their religious faith unless the state has a compelling reason to
demand complian ce. 2 93 There is no compelling reason for the state to
require citizens to treat same-sex marriages as valid.

Thus, laws

validating same-sex marriages would be subject to a religious exception
in these states and would feed demands for exemptions in states that
do not already have religious freedom laws.

Such demands would

generate disputes that undermine the goal of encouraging tolerance
2 8 9 See, e.g., Family Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601-2654 ( 1994) (requiring certain employers to
grant employees leave i n some situations) .
2 90 SAN FRANCISCO, CA., ORDINANCE 97-96-33.1 ( 1 996) .

29 1 See Nancy ]. Knauer, Domestic PaTtnership and Same-Sex Relationships: A Mmketpla.ce
Innovation and a Less Than Perfect Institutiorw.l Choice, 7 TEMP. POL. & CN. RTS. L. REV. 337, 3 4 1
( 1 998) (discussing t h e ordinance and the controversy surrounding it) .
2 92 " [T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply
with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability . . . "' Employment Div., Dep't. of Human
Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 ( 1 990) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3
( 1 982) (Stevens,]., concurring) ) .
29 3 The Supreme Court held the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act
unconstitutional, at least as applied to the states. City of Boerne v. Flores, 5 2 1 U.S. 507, 534-36
( 1 997) .
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of hom osexuality.

G. Validating Gay Marriages Will Fuel Hostility to Religion
Because America's largest religious denominations all condemn
homosexuality, legal validatio n of same-sex m arriages would delegi
timize these sects.

Many gay activists desire this consequence.

They

hope that, with the l aw's moral backing, traditional religious attitudes
toward homosexuality "will ultimately be discredited and forced to the
margi n . "291 Their particular target is Catholicism, and their goal is to
"Stop the Church"295 by tactics that include desecratio n of the Mass.
In his award-winning book,

1 11e1r l anguage is often VICious.

Becoming a Man,

On

Paul Monette called opponents of gay activism "the

Nazi Popes and all their brocaded m inions, the rat-brain politicians,
the wacko fundamen talists and their Book of Lies. "296 As already
noted,297 legal recognition of sam e-sex m arriages would force religious
people and institutions to seek exemptions from various l aws.
very n ecessity of seeking such

exemptions m akes

the

Th e

p eti tioners

appear aberrational.
Moreover, churches that disapprove same-sex m arriages could lose
their t:a.'\: exemptions.

The Supreme Court compelled the In ternal

Revenue Service to withdraw the tax exemption of Bob Jones Univer
sity because it forbade interracial dating among students. AJ though the
school rule broke no l aw, the Court held that i t contravened a national
policy against racial separation and therefore disqualified the school
from a tax exemption. 298

If gay m arriages are l egally recognized,

churches that refuse to acknowledge or perform them could l ose their
t:t."'C. exenlptjons on tJ1e same

theor-y of vi olating

natio11al policy even if

the refusal did not break any l aw. 299
Tradi tional Jews

and

Christians

could

2 ·1

also suffer employment

9 Larry W. Yackle, Parading Ounelves: Freedom of Sj;eech at the Feast of Sl. Patrick, 73 B . U .
REv. 79 1 , 792 ( 1 993 ) . See generally Duncan, sujna n o te 1 6.
295

L.

This is the title of a documen tary film about the disruption and desecrati o n of a

celebration of th e Mass by AIDS and hom osexual activists at St. Patrick's Cathedral in New York
City.

See Duncan , supra n o te 1 03, at 601-0 4 .

296 PAUL !vlONETfE,

ON BECOMING A l\1AN 2 ( 1 99 2 ) .

297 See sujmi n o tes 290-93 a n d accompanying text.
298 Bob Jones U n iv. v. U n i ted States, 461 U.S. 57-1 ( l 983 ) .
299 See, e.g., J u d i th C. Miles, Beyond B o b Jones: Towrnd the Elimination of Govemuumtol Subsidy
ofDiscriminolion by l'IJ;ligiolis Instit-utions, 8 HARV. WOMEN's LJ 3 1 , 34 ( 1 985) (argu i n g for d e n i al

of tax benefits to churches that discri m i n a te ) .
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discrimination if employers are forbidden to discriminate against
homosexual employees, customers, etc. Because traditional Jews and
Christians consider homosexual acts sinful, they might be considered
likely to offend homosexuals. Indeed, a mere statement that one is a
Jew or Christian might offend homosexuals. Employers might, there
fore, feel constrained to exclude or to limit the job opportunities of
traditional Jews and Christians.
Religion is generally a positive force in America, 300 so activity that

acts to fuel hostility toward religion is harmful, even to th e interests of
homosexuals.

Although

our

principal

religious

denominations

condemn homosexual acts, they also advocate love and understanding
for,

and deplore violence against, homosexuals. 30 1 Thus hostility

against traditional religious sects is likely not only to anger their
adherents but also to weaken the restraints that these sects exert on
violence and discrimination against gays.

H. Public Health
Same-sex marriage is sometimes touted as a means of improving the
health of h omosexuals.

The theory is that gay promiscuity, which

spreads AIDS and other diseases, results from social condemnation of
homosexuality and a lack of proper models: legal recognition would

encourage gay marriage and discourage promiscuity.302 It is question
able how far this goal would be realized.

If social disapproval caused

homosexual promiscuity, lesbians would also be promiscuous, but they

are not.30 3 Americans have grown more tolerant of homosexuality in
recent decades, but this has not reduced gay men's promiscuity, and
the cities most toleran t of homosexuality have the most promiscuity.

Even the threat of AIDS and other diseases only slightly ( and perhaps

3 00 See generally LEWY, supm note 205.

301 In a pastoral letter entitled "Always Our Children" the National Conference of Catholic
Bishops said: "God does not love someone any less simply because he or she is homosexual."
The l e tter encouraged parents to love gay children. Bishops Say Gay Children Need Support, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1 , 1997, atAI4 (quoting the letter) .
3 0 2 See ESKRIDGE, supm note 9, at 8-10, 209 (validating gay marriages would "civilize" gays
and reduce promiscuity). Andrew Sullivan considers the widespread promiscuity of gays "de
praved" but says it is not "inevitable" but occurs only because gays now lack the proper "social
incentives." SULLNAN, supra note 1 0 1 , al 1 07. If gay marriages were valid, most gays would
marry "with as much (if not more) commitment as heterosexuals." ld. at 1 83.
303 See infra note 31 1 .
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temporarily) reduced promiscuity.304

It seems that men tend to be

promiscuous. 305
In married men promiscuity is curbed by the attitudes of >vives and
children and by their demands on the man's time and m oney.

"It is

not h e terosexuality that contributes s tability [ to marriage] , but the
presence of a female. "306

Society has reason to d e ter adultery-it

disrupts families and thus injures children. Advocates of gay m arriage,
though, laud its greater tolerance of adultery.307 Further, the social en
dorsement conveyed by legitimizing gay maniage would facilitate homosexual conduct and unsafe sex.308 The public h ealth argument
for gay mm.�age is at best too weak to overcome

the powerful

arguments against it.

I. Recognizing Same-Sex 1\!Ianiages 1\!Iay Not Benefit Homosexuals
Validating gay marriage m ay not even benefit hom osexuals.

Few

gay couples registered under Hawaii 's domestic partnership law.3 09
Further, "most lesbians, who grow up facing the same stigmas and the
same lack of role m odels

as

m ale homosexuals, live conve n ti onal lives

and form long-term monogamous relationships. Why, wi th gay men,

304 See GABRIEL ROTELLO,

SEXUAL ECOLOGY 92-95, 1 1 1 ( 1 997) (stating t h a t gay promiscuity

thrives despite AlDS and that many gays oppose any effort to discourage promiscuity) ;
MICHAELANGELO

SIGNORILE,

LIFE

OUTSIDE

conclusio n ) ; Kevin Sack, H./. 1� Peril

227-32,

306-07

and Rising Drug Use, N.Y.

( 1 997)

( d rawing

the

same

TIMES, Jan. 29, 1 999, at A I O

(reporting increase o f unsafe sex among gay m en ) . For philosophical defenses of promiscui ty,
see

inji"a. note 3 1 6. Promiscuity is the norm and lasting fidelity th e exception among gay m e n .

In one study 50% of gay white m e n reporteri having over 5 0 0 sexual partners.

Weinberg,

Be!! &

supra note 1 49, at 85. In another only 8% of gay men were "dating" only one p e r

son; 87% had multiple partners.

Fifty-seven percent reported over 30 partners in the

preceding year. ADVOCATE, Aug. 23, 1 994, at 22-23.

Much of the promiscuity of gay m e n

See PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AlviERICAN COUPLES 295, 58586 ( 1 983) ; see alm supra note 230.
occurs \\�th s trangers.

305 See POSNER, supra note 1, at 90-92.
306 DONALD WEBSTER CORY, THE H O MOSEXUAL

IN AlviERICA: A SUBJECTIVE APPROACH 1 4 1

( 1 95 1 ) .

307 See supra notes 224-33 and accompanying text.
308 See supra notes 1 5 2-61 and accompanying text
according to social attitudes) .

(levels of homosexual actiVIty vary

Married gays migh t be less likely to use condoms, and m o re

likely to spread AlDS, because use of condoms implies adultery by oneself o r one's spouse.
Richard A . Posner,

Should The-re Be Homosexual Maniage? And If So, Who Should Decide?, 95

See

MICH.

L. REv. 1 578, 1 582 n.8 ( 1 997) .

309 S!!e supm

note 5 7 and accompanying text;

see also Foster, supra note 1 , a t 327 ( n o ti n g

that few gay couples take domestic partnership benefi ts ) .
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are quasi-marriages the exception to the rule?"310

643

Men, it seems, are

more promiscuous than women.3 1 1

Also, the presence of children
helps to keep married couples together. 31 2 Since homosexual couples
do not procreate and gay males, at least, rarely adopt, gay marriages
would be less durable.
Moreover, many homosexuals despise marriage as stiflint1 3 and
fear that validating gay marriage "would further outlaw all gay and
lesbian sex that is not performed in a marital context."3 1 4 For some,
promiscuity is desirable, not a fault to be corrected by pushing gays
into marriage.315

Some lesbians disdain marriage as inherently p atri

archal and prefer lesbian communes or question whether lesbian
lovers should even live together.31 6 Further, some favor gay marriage
in order to revolutionize the institution.317 They would probably drop
their support if recognition meant only extending traditi onal marital

31° Krista!, supra. note l l 1 , at 46; see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 83 ("The majority of
suiVeys taken in the last twenty years have found more l esbians than gay men in committed
long-term relationships."). This fact is particularly striking because gay men are more
numerous than l esbians. See supra note 1 62.
3 1 1 See POSNER, supra note 1 , at 90-92.

3 1 2 See POSNER, supra note 1 , at 305-07, 3 1 2.

313 See Freiberg, supra note 232; Steven K. Horner, Against Maniage, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 505 (1994) ; David W. Dunlap, Some Gay Rights Advocates Question Drive to Defen.d Same-Sex
Maniage, N.Y. TIMES,June 7, 1 996, atA12.
314 Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since ·when is Mamage a Path to Liberation ?, OUT/LOOK, Fall , 1 9 89, at
9, 1 6, reprinted in LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW 401 , 403 (William Rubinstein, ed., 1993); see
also Charles R.P. Pouncy, Mamage and Domestic Partnership: Rationality and Inequality, 7 TEMP.
POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REv. 363, 370 ( 1998) ('The extension of same-sex marriage will cloak gay
and lesbian couples in the traditions of patriarchy and heterosexism. Heterosexual norms will
become the standards applied to lesbian and gay relationships, and the development of queer
cultural constructions of intimate relationships will be stunted.") (footnote omitted).
315 For philosophical defenses of promiscuity see DAVID AJ. RlCHARDS, SEX, DRUGS,
DEATH, AND THE LAW: AN ESSAY ON HUMAN RlGHTS AND 0VERCRJMINALIZATION 29-63, 87-88, 9395 ( 1 982) ; Frederick Elliston, In Defense of homiscuity, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEX
AND LOVE 1 46 (Robert M. Stewart, ed. 1995 ) ; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Gay Culture Weighs Sense and
Sexuality, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1 997, at B6 (describing debate among gays in which some "argue
that promiscuous sex is the essence of gay liberation") .
31 6 See RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (OUT) LAW: SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF LAW 1 24-27
( 1 992); Ettelbrick, supra note 314, at 14-17; Freiberg, supm note 225; at 1 8; SARAH LUCIA
HOAGLAND, LESBIAN ETHICS: TOWARD NEW VALUE ( 1988); CLAU D IA CARD, LESBIAN CHOICES
( 1995) ; Nancy D. Polikoff, supra note 53, at 1536 (calling marriage "an inherently problematic
institution that betrays the promise of both lesbian and gay liberation and radical feminism"
and that "the desire to marry in the lesbian and gay community is an attempt to mimic the
worst of mainstream society" ) .
317 See supra notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
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norms t o homosexuals.
The push for legal recognition may also be a strategic error. Mter
the decision in Baehr v. Lewin opposition to · gay marriage grew in
Hawaii. 31 8 The quest for recognition also incurs opportunity costs.
The energy it absorbs could, for example, be used to deter gay bashing
and to reduce the spread of HIV and AIDS and help those already
infected. The push for legal recogniti on of gay marriage may also
alienate potential allies on these other issues.
David Chambers, who favors gay marriage, notes that Mormons
were reviled and persecuted in the 1 9th Century, largely because they
practiced polygamy.

He says "the Mormons triumphed through
surrender. Mter disavowing plur.:U marriage, they were accepted into
'civilized' society and have thrived. "319

The hostility to gay marriage

manifested in adoption of the Defense of Marriage Act and similar
state laws3 2 0 while society simultaneously grows more tolerant of other
aspects of homosexuality suggests that retreat on the issue of same-sex
marriage might be a wise tacti c for those who seek greater social
acceptance ofhomosexuality.
This article will not

try

to resolve or even join the debate among

homosexuals; it merely notes the existence of the debate and the
corollary that we cannot a5sume that legal recognition of same-sex
marriages is desired by or desirable for homosexuals.

VI. CONCLUSION
Those who have advocated l egal recognition of same-sex marriage
have acted in good faith belief that it would benefit homosexuals
without harming others.

It is now clear that this belief is false. The

advocates should reconsider their position and, if they truly care about
the well-being of our children and of our society, present and future,
they should support traditional marriage.

31 8 In a 1993 poll roughly 60% opposed gay marriage, 30% favored it, and 1 0 % were
undecided. See Same-Sex Marriages Not So Popular, HONOLULU STAR.-BULL.,June 1 9, 1 993, at A I ;
Linda Hosek, Poll: Unions for Gays Won't Hurt Isle Image, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., Feb. 3, 1 994, at
A6. A 1996 poll found opposition had risen to 7I %. See Same-Sex Maniages Opposed by 71 % in
Pol� HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Feb. 23, 1996, at AI.
319 Chambers, supra. note 243, at 77; see also Ralph Wedgwood, What An We Fighting FoT?,
HARV. GAY & LESBIAN REv., Fall 1 997, at 32-33 (advocating pursuit of the rights and benefits of
marriage for gays and not "'marriage' as such") .
320 See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.

